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IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION OF FOREIGNERS IN 
ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED STATES 
Yuval Livnatt 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the challenge which free speech poses to Israeli 
immigrationpolicy. It does so, first, by looking into the American immigra-
tion policy regarding ideological exclusions, i.e. refusing entry of a for-
eigner to the U.S., or the deportation of one from it, solely due to the 
foreigner'sideologicalbelief As discussed in this article, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has been consistently reluctantto strike down laws and regulations 
barring entry of foreigners due to their ideological convictions, from the 
beginning of the previous century, throughout the Cold-War era, and up 
until the recent upholdingof PresidentTrump's travel ban. The article then 
turns to suggest that this doctrine of ideological exclusion is evolving in 
Israeli immigrationpolicy and law too, and discusses the possible lessons 
that Israel could learnfrom the American experience in the field. Three 
Israeli case studies from the last decade are presented and analyzed: the 
deportationof a Messianic Jew; the Israeli-PalestinianBereaved Families 
for Peace conference; anda recent amendment of the Entry into IsraelLaw 
allowing for the exclusion of activists who support boycotting Israel or its 
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The analysis of the 
aforementioned cases i  conducted along two axes. One is the location of 
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the foreigner, which leads to the suggestion thatforeignersalready inside 
the country are independently entitled to the protection of freedom of 
speech prescribedby internationalhuman rights law and by IsraeliConsti-
tutional Law, yet are not necessarily entitled to extend their visa just by 
invoking their right to free speech. The second axis is the Israeli citizens' 
and citizenry's right to freedom of speech, which encompasses the right to 
listen, obtain information and engage in dialogue (with aforeigner). This 
analysis leads to the conclusion that although foreigners do not have a 
right to enter Israel based on their own right to freedom of speech, the 
citizenry has a right that the state will not prevent the admissionofforeign-
ers solely for their ideologicalbelief 
INTRODUCTION 
A traditional view - explicitly pronounced in Anglo-American legal 
precedents from the late nineteenth century,1 is that a state is permitted to 
exclude foreigners, for any reason whatsoever, either by not allowing them 
to enter its territory to begin with or by deporting them upon entry. Let's 
call this traditional principle "the state's exclusion prerogative" (hereinafter, 
SEP). A further traditional understanding is that SEP emanates from sover-
eignty. Just as a sovereign state, by virtue of its sovereignty, is entitled to 
resist foreign armies from invading its territory, so - holds the traditional 
view - it is entitled to keep out citizens of foreign states.2 Hence, SEP is 
perceived as extra-constitutional, in a sense that a state may invoke it 
whether or not it is explicitly acknowledged by its constitution.' 
Even though this traditional view of SEP is generally held by most 
national courts, international bodies and legal scholars,4 its rationale seems 
not to be sharpened enough.' Its outlines are not entirely clear, and its abso-
lutism has been increasingly eroded throughout the end of the twentieth 
1. See, e.g., Musgrove v. Chan Teeong Toy, 1891 A.C. 272 (1891) (in the U.K); 
Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case, 
in the U.S). For a similar view in Israel, see HCJ 582/71 Clark v. Minister of Interior, 
27(1) PD 113, 116-18 (1972). 
2. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BOR-
DERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) 83. 
3. Louis Henkin, The Constitutionaland United States Sovereignty: A Century of 
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 857 (1987). 
4. For a legal scholar challenging the cornerstones of this view, see James A. R. 
Nafziger, The GeneralAdmission ofAliens underInternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 
804 (1983). 
5. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and 
Human Rights, Et Cetra, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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century, and the beginning of the current one.6 Nowadays, courts and schol-
ars alike normally refrain from labeling SEP as an unqualified state power 
and will generally add a bracketed "almost" before this label. They might 
talk of a "broad" (even "very broad") discretion of the Executive in matters 
of immigration, but will stop short of the "absolute." Moreover, an under-
standing has emerged, the fact that SEP is extra-constitutional does not en-
tail that it is immune from constitutional constraints, or judicial review.7 
The current legal perception is that domestic (constitutional) law, as well as 
international law can circumscribe the principle of sovereignty, and conse-
quently of SEP. National courts can (and regularly do) review decisions not 
to allow foreigners in, and - more so - to refrain from their deportation, 
based on an array of legal norms. 
In this article I will focus on a particular kind of encroachment on 
SEP, one which emanates from the right to freedom of speech. Moreover, 
while I will explore both the foreigner's and the citizen's right to freedom 
of speech - and the way in which their correlative and corresponding 
rights might, at times, influence the foreigner's right to enter a foreign 
country or to continue staying in it - my attention would be mainly on the 
citizen's, rather than the foreigner's right. In other words, while not over-
looking the foreigner's own right to free speech (or - at times - lack 
thereof, as discussed below), I will focus on the citizen's (or the citizenry's) 
right to listen to and exchange ideas with a foreign national in the citizen's 
own country, as part of the citizen's right to freedom of speech, and a 
state's correlative duty to admit the foreigner into its territory or not to 
deport her, as part of its duty to protect its citizens' constitutional rights, 
who might wish to converse. 
While the notion of ideological exclusion of foreigners has been 
straightforwardly practiced in the United States for decades, with its peak 
during the Cold War period, when Congress passed the McCarran-Walter 
Act,8 it took Israel longer to employ a similar measure by an act of the 
Knesset. Only in 2017 did the Israeli Knesset amend the law to enable the 
exclusion of foreigners, who call for the boycott of Israel (this amendment 
will be discussed in detail in Part III(C) below). However, as I will show in 
this article, anecdotal violations of the freedom of speech of foreigners took 
6. NEumAN, supra note 2, at 121. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 
(2001); State of Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (2017) (United states case law); 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1) (banning discrimination in the 
issuance of immigrant visas on a variety of grounds). 
7. Henkin, supra note 3, at 858. 
8. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1982)). 
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place in Israel before 2017 as well. In most of these cases, however, Israeli 
courts failed to realize the collateral effect of such violations on the free-
dom of speech of Israeli citizens, and furthermore, failed to rule that SEP 
should be restricted in order to prevent such collateral effect. 
This disregard is surprising, since the idea that a constitutional right of 
a citizen could result in a curtailment of SEP is well recognized in Israel in 
other contexts, such as bi-national partnerships and marriages. The Supreme 
Court of Israel ruled that the constitutional right to family life derives from 
the right to human dignity (which, in turn, is enumerated in Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty).9 It further ruled that an Israeli citizen is, in 
principle, entitled to exercise that right with his or her foreign partner in 
Israel.10 To that end, the Court has repeatedly ruled, the Ministry of Interior 
must admit the foreign partner into the country, and refrain from deporting 
him or her as long as the relationship with the Israeli citizen sincerely re-
mains, absent overriding serious concerns, e.g. threat to public safety." 
The notion that a foreigner may gain a permit to enter and sojourn in 
Israel by "piggybacking" on an Israeli citizen's constitutional right is, there-
fore, well familiar to Israeli jurists and courts. A similar analysis, I argue, 
applies when freedom of speech (rather than the right to family life) is at 
stake.1 2 As a matter of fact, the Israeli Supreme Court has recognized such a 
possibility some decade and a half ago, in the matter of Levy v. Managerof 
Industry and Services Departmentfor Foreign Workers' Permits.13 Unfor-
tunately, however, the Court's reference to the possibility that a foreigner 
9. HCJ 7052/03 AdalahLegal Centrefor Arab Minority Rights in Israeland other 
v. Minister of Interiorand others, 61(2) PD 202 (2006)(for English translation: http:// 
elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG%5C03%5C520%5C070%5Ca47/03070520.a47.htm). 
10. Id. majority opinion of Judges Barak, Beinisch, Joubran, Hayt, Procaccia, 
Adiel, Rivlin and Levy. 
11. See, e.g., HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior,53(2) PD 728 (1998); 
AdminA 4614/05 State of Israel v. Oren, 61(1) PD 211 (2006). 
12. True, in denying a request for family reunification, the person who's right was 
infringed is identified, while in the case of an ideological exclusion, the right that was 
infringed is the public's right to know, and not necessarily of a distinct citizen. In Israel, 
the public's right to know was recognized in HCJ 243/62 IsraelMovie Studios Ltd. v. 
Greg, 16 PD 2407, 2414-15 (1962). In addition, while in many cases rights that belong 
to the public (such as security), are used to trump individual rights, this is the opposite 
case. Meaning, the public's right to know is in line with the individual's right to free-
dom of speech. For a discussion regarding how the public's right to security might 
infringe on an individual's right to liberty, see CrimaA 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of 
Israel, 49(3) PD 365 (1995) (holding that a felony which is a "national calamity" can-
not, in itself, suffice for remanding without bail). 
13. HCJ 9723/01 Levy v. Manager of Industry and Services Departmentfor For-
eign Workers' Permits, 57(2) PD 87 (2003). 
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would enter Israel by "piggybacking" on citizens' free speech rights was an 
obiter dictum in Levy, and was perfunctorily mentioned in the case, without 
much elaboration. The Levy obiter was never referred to by a subsequent 
court decision, and the notion that an alien might be allowed entry into the 
country due to free speech concerns was neglected.1 4 
The petitioner in Levy was the business manager of a group of Brazil-
ian female dancers, who performed throughout Israel. The Ministry of Inte-
rior (MOI) rejected his application for renewal of the visas of four of the 
dancers. The Ministry claimed that Levy should employ Israeli dancers in-
stead. In his petition to the Court, Levy argued that MOI's refusal was un-
reasonable, as Israeli dancers could not perform the Brazilian folkloristic 
dancing. He further argued that the refusal would harm him financially and 
is a violation of his right to freedom of occupation. 
The Court's starting point was the notion of SEP, but it then stated that 
SEP must be balanced against competing interests. One of these interests, 
the Court wrote, is freedom of occupation: "Migrant workers policy .... 
should take into account, among other considerations, the person's [the citi-
zen's] freedom of occupation and the possible violation of this right when 
that person's occupation obligates employment of foreign workers, which 
cannot be substituted by local workers."15 
A second competing interest, continued the Court, is "freedom of ex-
pression and the exposure to the culture of the world." 16 After underlining 
the importance of exposure to other cultures in fields such as art, science, 
academia, sports and light entertainment, the Court wrote the following: 
The aforementioned value of openness and exposure to the cul-
tures of the world relates also to the individual's right to freedom of 
expression, which is one of the fundamental values in law. Freedom 
of expression is not only the freedom to express opinions, to write 
and to perform, but also to "watch and listen" . . . The right to "watch 
and listen" is granted to each person according to his own taste and 
inclination. The exercise of such right could justify under certain cir-
cumstances permitting foreigners to sojourn in Israel and to work in 
their unique fields [of occupation] . . . . This consideration should be 
14. As will be discussed in Part III below, this notion was raised in the Supreme 
Court's decision in AdminA 7216/18 Lara Alqasem v. Immigration and Population 
Authority, para. 17 (Oct. 18, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
However, as I will argue there, the Court failed to discuss this idea in depth in the 
Alqasem case as well. 
15. Levy, supra note 13 at 92. 
16. Id. at 94. 
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included among the agency's considerations when it comes to set cri-
teria for the sojourn of foreigners within different time boundaries.17 
As mentioned above, the "piggybacking" obiter in Levy was never 
cited by subsequent court decisions, not even in the cases discussed at 
length in Part III, which revolved around restricting (potential) citizen-for-
eigner dialogue. Moreover, Israeli courts have so far overlooked the Ameri-
can legislation, mainly from the Cold War era, which sanctioned the 
exclusion of foreigners based on their political ideology, the judicial review 
of it - which dealt also with the "piggyback" argument - and the critical 
review of it by American legal academia. This disregard to American juris-
prudence on the matter is surprising, as Israeli courts frequently refer to 
American precedents, particularly in the area of free speech. 18 I purport to 
rectify this omission in this article, and to suggest a sound analysis of ideo-
logical bans on immigrants, which considers freedom of expression, build-
ing on the American experience. 
Part I will introduce the concept of ideological exclusion by focusing 
on American case law relevant to the issue. At the end of Part I, I discuss 
possible implications of the American account for Israel, which experiences 
a surge in the number of cases of ideological exclusions. Part II deals with 
freedom of speech of citizens and aliens, along two axes. The first axis is 
the location of the alien (whether outside of the country and wishing to 
enter or inside the country and wishing to stay). The second axis is a citi-
zen's vs. an alien's right to freedom of speech. The analysis suggests that an 
alien, who is under a state's jurisdiction, is entitled to the protection offered 
by the right to freedom of speech, alongside the citizens' correlative right. It 
further suggests that, while aliens do not have a right to enter a foreign 
country based on their own right to freedom of speech, the citizenry of that 
country has a right that the state will not prevent the admission of foreigners 
17. Id. 
18. The most notable judgement is HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. Ministerof the Inte-
rior, 7 PD 871 (1953), where Justice Agranat held that freedom of expression is recog-
nized in Israel. Pnina Lahav claims that Justice Agranat was highly influenced by his 
American legal education and by a trip to the United States, made around the writing of 
the Judgement. Pnina Lahav, FoundationsofRights Jurisprudencein Israel: ChiefJus-
tice Agrantat's Legacy, 24 ISR. L. REv. 211, 247-51 (1990). For other free speech 
judgements referring to American jurisprudence see HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcast-
ing Authority Management Board, 41(3) IsrSC 255 (1987); HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Com-
mander of the Southern Districtof the IsraeliPolice, 38(2) PD 393 (1984) (for English 
translation: https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/levi-v-commander-southern-district-
israeli-police); HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. The Chief Military Censor, 42(4) PD 617 
(1989) (for English translation: http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/ 
opinions/Schnitzer%20v.%20Chief%20Military%20Censor.pdf). 
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due to their ideological belief. Part III introduces and analyzes Israeli case 
law regarding ideological exclusions: The case of Barry Martin Lawrence 
Barnett, a Messianic Jew who was deported from Israel for protesting with 
other Messianic Jews; The Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families for Peace 
case, which dealt with the decision of the Minister of Defense to forbid the 
entry of Palestinians to Israel for the participation in an alternative Memo-
rial Day ceremony; and the Anti-BDS legislation, which includes the 2011 
Boycott Law, the 2017 Amendment to the Entry into Israel law, and the 
judicial review of their constitutionality. Thereafter, a Conclusion is 
offered. 
I. IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
LESSON FOR ISRAEL 
No other democracy has engaged in explicit ideological exclusion of 
immigrants as the United States of America. As Israel seems to be follow-
ing the same path, I find it useful to discuss in some detail the American 
background, nature, and evolvement of such bans throughout the years. Af-
ter describing the American jurisprudence on this matter, I will present 
some insights, which are - I believe - applicable to Israel. 
A. The Early Days 
Ideological exclusions in the United States date back to the end of the 
Colonial Period, when colonies excluded immigrants on the basis of unor-
thodox religious beliefs. 19 In 1903, following the 1901 assassination of 
President William McKinley by an anarchist,20 and a two decades long tur-
moil regarding the rise of Anarchism and Marxism in Europe, 2 1 the first 
legislation denying entrance to the United States on the basis of political 
belief and affiliation was enacted. 22 The Immigration Act of 1903 (hereinaf-
ter, the 1903 Act) allowed to exclude "anarchists, or persons who believe in 
19. Mitchell C. Tilner, IdeologicalExclusion ofAliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 
2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4-8 (1987). For a broad overview of ideological exclusions in 
the United States from the 17th century to the 20th century, see id. at 8-65. 
20. Sidney Fine, Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley, 60 AM. HIsT. 
REV. 777, 780-81 (1955). 
21. See Tilner, supra note 19, at 13-26 (describing the domestic economic diffi-
culties at that time and how the rise of Marxism in Europe triggered anti-alienism and 
anti-radicalism in the United States). 
22. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213. See also Tilner, supra note 19, 
at 30-31. In 1907, Congress reenacted the 1903 Act and continued the exclusion of 
Anarchists. See Tilner, supra note 19, at 36-39. 
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or advocate the overthrow by force or violence law, or the assassination of 
public officials" from entering the United States23 
The 1903 Act was reviewed and upheld as constitutional by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in the case of United States ex rel. Turner 
v. Williams.24 Turner, a citizen of England, delivered a lecture in New York 
in which he declared himself to be an Anarchist. 25 He was subsequently put 
under immigration detention, and brought before a Board of Special Inquiry 
in the immigration station at Ellis Island, after a warrant signed by the Sec-
retary of the Department of Commerce and Labor was issued against him.26 
Turner challenged the 1903 Act by claiming, among other things, that it 
contravenes the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The Court held 
that the 1903 Act is constitutional and upheld the proceedings against Tur-
ner. 27 "[A]s long as human governments endure," the Court wrote, "they 
cannot be denied the power of self-preservation, as that question is 
presented here." 2 
The Act of 1903 was repealed by the Act of 1917 (hereinafter, the 
1917 Act), 29 at a time of heated political climate regarding the United 
States' imminent entry into World War 1.30 The 1917 Act retained the ex-
clusion of anarchists, but also excluded aliens "who advocate or teach the 
unlawful destruction of property." 31 This provision was meant to exclude 
aliens supporting the Industrial Workers of the World. In 1918, soon after 
the Russian Revolution, Congress enacted he Passport Act of 1918, which 
prohibited aliens from entering the United States without a visa and docu-
mentation. 32 Later that year, The 1917 Act was amended and broadened, 
thus excluding also aliens who teach the assassination of public figures and 
the overthrow of government. 33 
World War II provided the momentum needed for the introduction of 
the Alien Registration Act of 1940, also known as the Smith Act.34 The 
Smith Act amended the Passport Act of 1918, adding former belief in or 
advocacy of the proscribed doctrines (i.e. anarchism, overthrow of govern-
23. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214. 
24. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). 
25. Id. at. 280. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 291. 
28. Id. at 295. 
29. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 87. 
30. Tilner, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
31. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78. 
32. Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559. 
33. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 §1. 
34. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670. 
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ment, destruction of property and assassination of public figures) as well as 
former membership in organizations advocating said doctrines to the list of 
grounds for exclusions and deportations from the United States. 
In the case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court ex-
amined whether the United States may deport a resident alien, staying le-
gally in the country, because of membership in the Communist Party which 
terminated before enactment of the Smith Act. 35 The appellants, three legal 
aliens that were to be deported, all residing in the U.S. for over three de-
cades, 36 contended, among other things, that their deportations are prejudi-
cial to the First Amendment. The majority opinion held, however, that the 
First Amendment does not prevent the deportation of the appellants, since 
the advocation for a change of government by force and violence, as a 
membership in the Communist party dictates, is not protected speech. 
While the outcome was harsh for the appellants-deportees, it should be 
noted that in its reasoning, the Court, for the first time, jettisoned its tradi-
tional view - dated from the Chinese Exclusion Case37 - that immigra-
tion policy is totally immune from judicial review. 38 
B. Exclusion under the McCarran-WalterAct (1952-1990) 
In 1952, following an overridden veto by President Truman,39 and pre-
ceding the height of the Cold War, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
35. Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
36. Harisiades was a Greek national that lived in the United States for 36 years 
and was a married to an American citizen. Mascitti, an Italian national, lived in the 
United States for 32 years. Mrs. Coleman, a Russian native, was also married to an 
American citizen, and lived in the United States for 38 years. All were members of the 
Communist Party in their past. 
37. Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
38. However, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion: "... .whether immigra-
tion laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in 
general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress. 
Courts do enforce the requirements imposed by Congress upon officials in administer-
ing immigration laws, e.g., Kwock Jan Fatv. White, 253 U. S. 454, and the requirement 
of Due Process may entail certain procedural observances. E.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U. S. 276. But the underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to 
enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay are for Congress exclusively to 
determine, even though such determination may be deemed to offend American tradi-
tions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace." Harisiades, supra note 35 at 
597. 
39. President's Message to Congress Vetoing the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, 1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 441 (June 25, 1952). 
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1952 (commonly known as "the McCarran-Walter Act") was enacted.40 
Section 1182(a)(27) authorized the consular officer and the Attorney Gen-
eral to exclude from entry to the United States aliens they had reason to 
believe are seeking entry ".... solely, principally, or incidentally to en-
gage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or en-
danger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States." 4 1 Section 
1182(a)(28) dealt with, in much detail, the exclusions of aliens who are 
affiliated with Anarchism and Communism. Finally, Section 1182(a)(29) 
banned the entry to the United States of aliens with respect to whom the 
consular officer or the Attorney General knows has reason to believe proba-
bly would, after entry, engage in activities that might undermine national 
security or overthrow the Government. 42 Unlike Section 1182(a)(27) and 
Section 1182(a)(29), Section 1182(a)(28) authorized the consular officer 
and the Attorney General to exercise discretion and to grant a waiver to an 
alien who is within any of the classes described, pursuant to a set of terms.43 
Most of the cases discussed below relate to this Section, which is the most 
problematic - from a First Amendment perspective - of the three. 
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the Attorney General's decision to exclude a Belgian citizen under Section 
1182(a)(28) and not to issue a waiver.44 This is the principal and most im-
portant decision concerning ideological exclusion f immigrants handed 
down by an American court, and possibly any court in the Western world, 
and will therefore be discussed in more detail. 
Ernest E. Mandel was a journalist and a publicist who advocated for 
communism,45 situated in Brussels. In 1969, he was invited to participate in 
a six-day long conference on Technology and Third World, at Stanford 
University, scheduled for October of that year.46 He applied to the Ameri-
can Consulate in Brussels for a visa, and was informed that his application 
40. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1982)). 
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27). The language used in this section derived from the 
Act of June 20, 1941, ch. 209, 55 Stat. 252, which amended the Passport Act of 1918 
and authorized the consular officers to refuse visas to any alien they knew or had reason 
to believe sought entry into the United States to engage in activities which will endan-
ger the public safety. See also Tilner, supra note 19, at 54. 
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29). 
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28). The terms included involuntary membership, being 16 
years of age, opposing public interest. 
44. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
45. See, e.g., ERNEST MANDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST ECONOMIC THE-
ORY (1967). 
46. Kleindienst, 408 U.S., at 757. 
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had been refused under Section 1182(a)(28), but that a request for a waiver 
has been forwarded to the Department of State in Washington, D.C. Later, 
the Department refused to issue a waiver because Mandel has violated the 
conditions and limitations attached to the visa issued to him in a previous 
visit to the United States, as he spoke at more universities than his visa 
application indicated, thus engaging in activities beyond the stated purposes 
of his trip.47 
Mandel and the various university professors who invited him ap-
pealed this refusal, against he Attorney General and the Secretary of State. 
They asserted, among other things, that Section 1182(a)28 of the McCar-
ren-Walter Act, preventing Mandel's entry to the United States, was uncon-
stitutional as it stands in contravention of the First Amendment. 48 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that "[t]he concern 
of the First Amendment is not with a non-resident alien's individual and 
personal interest in entering and being heard, but with the rights of the citi-
zens of the country to have the alien enter and to hear him explain and seek 
to defend his views." 49 Thus, Section 1182(a)(28) is invalid and void in 
regarding to the exclusion of Mandel.50 
The Attorney General and the Secretary of State appealed to the Su-
preme Court. Mandel agreed that he himself has no legal right to enter the 
United States, and the case dealt with "the narrow issue whether the First 
Amendment confers upon the appellee professors, because they wish to 
hear, speak, and ebate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that 
Mandel should be permitted to enter the country."5 1 The Court rejected the 
Government's argument that the exclusion of Mandel does not contravene 
the First Amendment and asserted that the First Amendment right of the 
American academics who invited him was indeed infringed.52 The Court 
also rejected the Government's suggestion that because the appellees had 
access to Mandel's ideas through his books, speeches and other technologi-
cal alternatives, the First Amendment is inapplicable, and refused to hold 
that the ".... existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any 
constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form of 
access."5 3 Thereafter, the Court recognized that the power to exclude aliens 
47. Id. at 758. 
48. Id. at 760. 
49. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 632 (E.D. N.Y. 1971). 
50. Id. at 634. 
51. Kleindienst, 408 U.S., at 762. 
52. Id. at 764-65. 
53. Id. at 765-66. Scholars have also asserted that the fact that an alternative to an 
encounter exists is a defective rationale for its ban. James W. Mohr, Opening the Flood-
gates to DissidentAliens, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 146-48 (1970) (claiming that 
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is inherent to the idea of the state's sovereignty and mentioned Congress's 
"plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude 
those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden."5 4 
Justice Blackmun, delivering the majority opinion of the Court, held 
that when the Executive Branch provides "a facially legitimate and bona 
fide reason" for denying a visa under Section 1182(a)(28), "courts will 
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing 
its justification against the First Amendment interests."5 5 In doing so, the 
majority refused to apply the regular standard of review applicable in cases 
of ostensible free speech violation under American constitutional law, i.e. 
strict scrutiny, which requires the government to demonstrate that it is using 
the most narrowly tailored means to achieve a governmental interest that is 
compelling (rather than a merely legitimate interest). Regarding Mandel, the 
Court held that his previous visa violation was a facially legitimate and 
bona fide reason for refusing to waive the Section 1182(a)(28) ban. 
Justice Douglas, dissenting, held that solely problems of national se-
curity or the import of drugs are in the interest of the Attorney General in 
this context. To his reading, Congress did not entrust the Attorney General 
with the discretion to discriminate among the ideological offerings of for-
eign lecturers.56 Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan, dissenting as well, 
held that in addition to the appellees' (professors') interests, the Govern-
ment has interfered with the public interest in the prevention of any stifling 
of political utterance. 57 Thus, the standard for refusing a waiver cannot be a 
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason," as "[m]erely 'legitimate' govern-
mental interest cannot override constitutional rights."5 8 Consequently, the 
standard for examining an exclusion of an alien based on her political views 
(which she wishes to share with American citizens) is whether it is neces-
sary to protect a compelling governmental interest, such as threats to na-
tional security, public health needs and genuine requirements of law 
enforcement.59 
"[t]he opportunity to confront ideas directly, to challenge and to ferret out details, is 
especially important to the academic and scientific ommunities and that the rationale 
"presupposes that the only ideas worth hearing are those which have been published."). 
54. Kleindienst, 408 U.S., at 766 (Citing Boutilierv. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123 (1967)). 
55. Id. at 770. 
56. Id. at 774. 
57. Id. at 776. 
58. Id. at 777. 
59. Id. at 783-84. 
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In 1977, following the Helsinki Accords of 1975,60 Congress enacted 
the McGovern Amendment to the McCarren-Walter Act. 61 The Amendment 
stipulated that the Secretary of State should recommend to the Attorney 
General that a wavier be granted to any alien who is a member or affiliate 
with a proscribed organization but otherwise admissible. The enactment of 
the Amendment led to waivers of a substantial number of aliens who could 
have been excluded under Section 1182(a)(28).62 In 1987, Section 901 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act was enacted and prohibited visa 
denials based on "beliefs, statements, or associations" which would be pro-
tected if engaged in by an American citizen in the United States. 63 
In 1989, in American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Meese,64 the 
District Court of California held, while citing Harisiades,that foreign na-
tionals legally staying in the U.S. (to be differentiated from immigrants 
wishing to enter the U.S. - such as Mandel at the time) are protected by 
the First Amendment even in the deportation setting, and that a regular First 
Amendment standard would be applied by the courts in reviewing their de-
portation orders. The plaintiffs, charged with being members of or affiliated 
with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who were 
issued deportation orders on such ground, challenged several Sections of 
the McCarran-Walter Act, dealing with exclusion of aliens already in the 
U.S., based on their ideology. 65 The District Court found the Sections to be 
unconstitutional as being in violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment. 
60. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 
1975, Dep't of State Pub. No. 8826 (Gen. For. Pol. Ser. 298), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 
1292, 1313-14 (1975). Under the Helsinki Accords, United States took an obligation to 
promote international freedom of information and movement. The Helsinki Accords 
lack the power of a treaty, and obligations under the agreement are not legally binding. 
For more information regarding the Helsinki Accords, see Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Re-
thinking the Role of Politics in United States ImmigrationLaw: The Helsinki Accords 
and Ideological Exclusion of Aliens, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV 301 (1988). 
61. Act of Aug. 17, 1977, Pub. L. 95-105, tit. I, § 112, 91 Stat. 844, 848 (codified 
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982)). 
62. Tilner, supra note 19, at 78. See also Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F. 2d 1043, 
1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the government can't avoid the McGovern 
amendment by denying visa application under Section (a)(27) on the basis of affiliation 
with a communist organization). 
63. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901(a), 101 Stat. 
1331, 1399-1401 (1987). 
64. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. 
Cal. 1989). 
65. 8 U.S. C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v), (H) (provisions which allowed for 
the deportation of aliens for advocating or teaching opposition to all organized govern-
ment, the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism, or 
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The judgment was overturned by the Court of Appeals due to lack of ripe-
ness of the issues, and remanded to the District Court for further delibera-
tion.66 However, the matter became moot shortly thereafter. In 1990, after 
suspending the ideological exclusion provisions of the McCarran-Walter 
Act, 67 Congress repealed the Act permanently and enacted the Immigration 
Act of 1990, which offered a narrower basis for an exclusion based on ideo-
logical criteria. 68 
During its 38 years, the McCarran-Walter Act sanctioned the exclusion 
of assertive, knowledgeable, intelligent, inspiring and interesting people (at 
least in the eyes of some members of American society), such as Nobel 
prize-winning author Gabriel Garcia Marquez, playwright Dario Fo, actress 
Franca Rame, NATO Deputy Supreme Commander Nino Pasti, and Horten-
sia Allende, widow of former Chilean President Salvador Allende. 69 There 
were many others, not as famous as the previously mentioned ones. When 
the act was finally repealed, there seemed to be a consensus that it was a 
long overdue instrument, associated with e infamous McCarthy era. 
However, there seems to be a crawling comeback of ideological, semi-
ideological or quasi-ideological exclusion of foreigners in current American 
immigration law. Communism, which replaced anarchism, was soon re-
placed by terrorism as the top national security concern affecting 
immigrants. 70 
C. 9/11 and Its Aftermath 
Shortly after the horrific Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and as a direct response thereof, Congress enacted the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly referred 
to as "the PATRIOT Act." Currently, Section 411 of the PARTIOT Act 
authorizes the Government to exclude any alien who had used a "position 
of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity," 
the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship and being a member 
in organizations that in engage in such activities). 
66. American-ArabAnti-Discrimination Com. v. Thornburgh, 940 F. 2d 445 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
67. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 
100-204, § 901(a), 101 Stat. 1331 (1987). 
68. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 (1990). See also W. Aaron 
Vandiver, Checking Ideas at the Border: Evaluating the PossibleRenewal of Ideologi-
cal Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 751, 759-60 (2006). 
69. See John Shattuck, FederalRestrictions on the FreeFlow of Academic Infor-
mation and Ideas, 3 Gov'T INFO. Q. 5, 14-15 (1986). 
70. Vandiver, supra note 68, at 761. 
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or to "persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organiza-
tion." 1 Section 411 also broadens the definition of terrorist activity in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act to include any crime that involves the use 
of a "weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary 
gain)."7 2 
In addition, the REAL ID Act7 3 eliminated the Secretary of State's 
need to substantiate that an alien's putative endorsement could undermine 
the United States' effort to combat terrorism.74 It also further expanded the 
use of ideological criteria, as an alien does not have to be in a position of 
prominence, and merely has to espouse or endorse terrorist activity to be 
inadmissible. 75 It also modified the Immigration and Nationality Act to de-
fine "engaging in terrorist activity" broadly. The definition includes "so-
licit[ing] funds or other things of value for . . . . a terrorist organization 
described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably 
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization."7 6 The defi-
nition of "terrorist organization" was also broadened considerably. It in-
cludes "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, 
which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the activities de-
scribed in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv)." 77 The said subclauses 
include committing, planning, soliciting funds for, soliciting individuals for, 
or providing material support for a terrorist activity.78 
For example, in the case of Khan v. Holder,79 the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of asylum and withholding of removal 
due to the fact that Khan, a citizen of India, has been involved in the Kash-
mir independence movement and worked with the Jammu Kashmir Libera-
tion Front ("JKLF"), a group dedicated to the establishment of an 
71. PATRIOT Act of 2001, § 411, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(VI) 
(2005). See also Hasan Z. Mansori, ManipulatingPublic Debate: Using the PATRIOT 
Act to Keep Out Foreign Scholars, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV 205 (2008). 
72. PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (2005). 
For example, Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1988 and 1989 defined "terrorism" as "premeditated, politically motivated vio-
lence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents." 
73. REAL ID Act of 2005, § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII) (2005). 
74. PATRIOT Act of 2001, § 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(VI) (2005). 
75. REAL ID Act of 2005, § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII) (2005). 
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc). 
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). 
79. Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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independent Kashmir. In Khan's testimony, that was found credible by the 
lower instances, he asserted that he was affiliated with only the political 
wing of the JKLF, that his work was entirely nonviolent in nature, and that 
he had no knowledge of the activities of the military wing of the JKLF. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling that Khan was statuto-
rily ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal under the REAL ID 
Act because he had engaged in a terrorist activity. 80 
D. The Trump Bans and the Mandel Heritage 
Shortly after his inauguration, President Trump introduced Executive 
Order 13769, then Executive Order 13780, and finally Proclamation 9645, 
all dealing with the exclusion of aliens from countries with predominant 
Muslim population.81 The constitutionality of all these measures was chal-
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV). 
81. The first Executive Order released by President Trump (Exec. Order No. 
13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) temporarily suspended entry into the United 
States of immigrants and nonimmigrants from countries referred to in Section 
217(a)(12) of the Immigration and Nationality Act-i.e. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Su-
dan, Syria, and Yemen - altogether. In the Executive Order, the President "pro-
claim[ed] that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States . . . . from 
[these] countries . . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the United States." Id. at 
§ 3(c). See Amy L. Moore, Even When You Win, You Lose: Executive Order 13769 & 
the Depressing State of ProceduralDue Process in the Context of Immigration, 26 
WILLIAM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 88-91 (2017). The Executive Order also suspended 
the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days. Following an injunction 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit against the Executive Order (Washington v. Trump (Wash-
ington II), 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)), President Trump issued a second temporary 
Executive Order, replacing the first one. 
The second Executive Order (Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 
2017)), subtitled "Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry 
into the United States," exempted lawful permanent residents, current visa-holders and 
took Iraq off the list of banned countries. In addition, a waiver program for refugees 
was instituted. Injunctions against the revised Executive Order were upheld by the 
Courts of Appeals of the Forth Circuit (InternationalRefugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 857 F. 3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017)) and the Ninth Circuit (Hawaiiv. Trump, 859 F. 
3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017)), and the Supreme Court issued a stay of the injunctions (Trump 
v. InternationalRefugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080). The stay narrowed the 
scope of the injunctions and exempted from the revised Executive Order foreign nation-
als with a "bona fide relationship" with a U.S. person or entity in the United States. 
Finally, in September 2017, President Trump announced Proclamation 9645 (Proc-
lamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24. 2017)). It suspends entry of immi-
grants and nonimmigrants from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen, and 
of immigrants from Somalia, and denies entry into the United Stated of certain officials 
of the government of Venezuela. The Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against the 
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lenged before the federal court system, and analyzed in a number of prelim-
inary yet lengthy decisions. All these decisions, including the one handed 
down by the Supreme Court, recognized the standing of American individu-
als and entities (such as State Universities) to bring action against the mea-
sures due to their allegation that the ban burdens their own constitutional 
rights.82 At the time of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court handed 
down an elaborate decision reversing the lower courts' nationwide prelimi-
nary injunction against the Proclamation. 83 This decision, while remanding 
the case to the lower court to discuss the merits of the case, left little 
grounds to strike the Proclamation down. 
The main argument against the two Executive Orders (currently not in 
force) and the Proclamation was that they are motivated by the desire to 
keep Muslims out of the United States, and therefore violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof." The Government denied that religious-based considera-
tions motivated any of these measures, and insisted that security-based rea-
sons are the grounds for it. 
As Mandel dealt with a First Amendment challenge to an immigration 
restriction, and since both free speech and freedom of religion are protected 
by the First Amendment, the Trump v. Hawaii84 Court inevitably revisited 
the Mandel case. While Chief Justice Roberts, in his principal majority 
opinion, rejected Justice Sotomayor's view (in her principal dissent opin-
ion), that Mandel's narrow standard of review was inapplicable to the 
case, 85 he nevertheless agreed to slightly raise the standard of judicial re-
Proclamation but narrowed its scope to give relief "only to those with a credible bona 
fide relationship with the United States." (Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168 (9th Cir. 
2017)). 




85. Justice Sotomayor argued that "there is a good reason to think" that Mandel 
was inapplicable to the case for a variety of reasons, discussed in footnote 5 of her 
opinion, among them that Mandel "involved a constitutional challenge to an Executive 
Branch decision to exclude a single foreign national under a specific statutory ground of 
inadmissibility . . . . Here, by contrast, President Trump is not exercising his discretion-
ary authority to determine the admission or exclusion of a particular foreign national. 
He promulgated an executive order affecting millions of individuals on a categorical 
basis. ." Id. at 14 (Justice Sotomayor, dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts rejected this 
view since "our opinions have reaffirmed and applied its [Mandel's] deferential stan-
dard of review across different contexts and constitutional claims." (Id. at 31). 
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view, based on the government's own acknowledgment, and "assuming" 
that such higher standard of review is the correct one: 
A conventional application of Mandel, asking only whether the 
policy is facially legitimate and bona fide, would put an end to our 
review. But the Government has suggested that it may be appropriate 
here for the inquiry to extend beyond the facial neutrality of the order 
.... For our purposes today, we assume that we may look behind the 
face of the Proclamation to the extent of applying rational basis re-
view. That standard of review considers whether the entry policy is 
plausibly related to the Government's stated objective to protect the 
country and improve vetting processes . . . . As a result, we may 
consider plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy so 
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification 
independent of unconstitutional grounds. 86 
So, while Chief Justice Roberts rejected Justice Sotomayor's opinion, 
that the strict scrutiny test, normally applicable to cases involving First 
Amendment ostensible violation, is applicable to the case, he did - de 
facto and arguendo, at least - agree to raise the standard of review from a 
Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" low standard of review 
to a higher (yet not too high) "rational basis" standard of review. The main 
difference between these two standards i that, according to the latter, the 
Court would examine whether the reason that the government gives for its 
act is actually and not just facially legitimate, and furthermore, inquire 
whether a rational connection exists between that reason and the means 
used to attain it. Still, legitimacy - rather than a compelling governmental 
interest and proportionality stricto sensu87 - is the normative criterion es-
poused in Trump v. Hawaii to override First Amendment concerns. 88 
86. Id. at 32. 
87. A proportionate balance between the social benefit embedded in the permis-
sive goal and the harm caused to the constitutional right. See: Aharon Barak, Propor-
tionality andPrincipledBalancing,4 LAw & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, at 6 (2010). 
88. However, Chief Justice Roberts insinuates that when the exclusion in not 
based on national security or foreign affairs considerations, he might be willing to es-
pouse a standard of review more stringent than the "rational basis" one. See in his 
footnote 5: "The dissent finds 'perplexing' the application of rational basis review in 
this context . . . . But what is far more problematic is the dissent's assumption that 
courts should review immigration policies, diplomatic sanctions, and military actions 
under the de novo "reasonable observer" inquiry applicable to cases involving holiday 
displays and graduation ceremonies. . . The dissent can cite no authority for its proposi-
tion that the more free-ranging inquiry it proposes is appropriate in the national security 
and foreign affairs context." 
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E. Insightsfor Israel 
This brief description of American law demonstrates that Israel is not 
the first democracy in the world to exclude aliens from its territory based on 
their ideological convictions. Still, such a policy is extraordinary, and other 
democracies generally refrained from espousing ideological exclusions of 
foreigners in their immigration laws (other than in cases involving clear 
security-based concerns). 89 Moreover, the American jurisprudence on ideo-
logical exclusion of foreigners, and the Mandel decision in particular, were 
criticized by numerous legal articles. 90 Judy Wurtzel, 91 for example, argued 
that the specific circumstances of Mandel (his previous visa abuses) pre-
vented the Supreme Court from offering additional examples as to what will 
be considered a legitimate and bona fide reason for visa refusal. 92 As a 
result, lower courts 93 were able to interpret the standard as they deemed fit, 
usually in a broad manner. This led the Mandel standard to be toothless. 
89. See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, art 77 
(Can.) (allowing for the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to sign a 
certificate stating that a permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible on 
grounds of security. On 1998, Syrian citizen Hassan Almrei applied for a visitor's visa. 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) determined that "Almrei behaved in 
a clandestine manner and that he visited a number of Arab Afghans," thus labeled him 
as a threat to security and as a member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell. Only eight years 
after his arrest, the security certificate against him was disposed. Sherene H. Razack, 
"Your Client has a Profile:" Race and National Security in Canada After 9/11, 40 
STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 3, 23 (2007)); Immigration Rules, (2016), para. 322(5) (allows 
for the refusal of a request to enter to or to remain in the United Kingdom of an alien 
for, among other things, " .... character or associations or the fact that he represents a 
threat to national security." This Rule was labeled as an ...... immigration rule de-
signed to tackle terrorism and those judged to be a threat to national security." Amelia 
Hill, Government U-turn over Anti-Terror Provision Used to Expel Migrants, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2018) (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/29/govern 
ment-review-anti-terror-law-section- 322-5-migrant-deport). 
90. See, e.g., Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to 
PoliticalDissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930, 936 (1987); Leonard David Egert, Grant-
ing Foreigners Free Speech Rights: The End of Ideological Exclusions, 8 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 721, 744-45 (1990); Mark W. Voigt, Visa Denials on Ideological 
Grounds and the FirstAmendment Right to Receive Information: The Casefor Stricter 
JudicialScrutiny, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 139 (1986). 
91. Judy Wurtzel, FirstAmendment Limitations on the Exclusion of Aliens, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 149 (1987). 
92. Id. at 163-64. 
93. Wurtzel discussed the following cases: Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 
(D.D.C. 1984), vacated, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986); 
HarvardLaw School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986), vacated as 
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Wurtzel further argued that the Mandel standard is simply wrong. She 
offered an interesting analogy between the right of a U.S. citizen to ex-
change ideas with a prisoner and the right of a U.S. citizen to exchange 
ideas with a foreigner. 94 In Procunierv. Martinez95 (which, interestingly 
enough, was cited in agreement by the Israeli Supreme Court96), the Ameri-
can Supreme Court held that while prisoners enjoy a diminished protection 
under the First Amendment, the exchange of letters between prisoners and 
outsiders is entitled to full constitutional protection, as "the interests of both 
parties are inextricably meshed." 97 According to Wurtzel, this holding is 
relevant to ideological exclusions of foreigners (which - like prisoners -
might enjoy limited First Amendment protection themselves), and corre-
sponds with the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan 
in Mandel, demanding a compelling government interest in order to justify 
curtailment of freedom of speech of the citizen who wishes to interact in a 
discussion with the foreigner. 98 Therefore, an exclusion of an alien by the 
government can be based on the content of his or her speech only if it could 
be established that the speech poses a clear and present danger to public 
security rather than that he or she merely advocates for a subversive doc-
trine or is affiliated with a disfavored organization. 99 
The academic criticism of the exclusionary provisions of the McCar-
ran-Walter Act, expressed by Wurtzel and others, the discomfort expressed 
by some of the American judges reviewing it, and the final repeal of the 
Act, demonstrate that the legal trend is against such ideological exclusion of 
foreigners. True, following the horrible attacks of 9/11 the pendulum swung 
back in the U.S. towards ideological bans, with the PATRIOT Act and the 
REAL ID Act as described above. But it is still a far narrower exclusion 
than the bans which were part of the McCarran-Walter Act. President 
Trump's two Executive orders and finally Proclamation 9645, all dealing 
with the exclusion of aliens from countries with predominant Muslim popu-
lation, were also justified by the government (whether truthfully or pretex-
moot, No. 86-1371 (1st Cir. June 18, 1986); Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. 
Mass. 1985); NGO Comm. v. Haig, No. 82 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1982) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982); ElWerfalli 
v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Wurtzel, supra note 91, at 164-71 
94. Wurtzel, supra note 91, at 175-79. 
95. Procunierv. Martinez, 416 US 396 (1974). 
96. Pris. Pet. App. 4463/94 HCJ 4409/94 Golan v. Israel Prison Authority, PD 
50(4) 136 (1996) (The Supreme Court of Israel cites Martinez and adopts its ruling on 
the diminished right of prisoners to freedom of speech). 
97. Martinez, 416 US 409. 
98. Supra note 44, at 777. 
99. Wurtzel, supra note 91, at 193. 
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tually) - just like the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID Act - on strict 
security concerns. These explanations were accepted by the Supreme Court, 
and stand at the basis of its refusal to issue a temporary injunction against 
the Proclamation. 100 In discussing the Trump Proclamation, the Court has 
also shown a willingness to jettison Mandel's very narrow standard of re-
view, even in matters involving national security and foreign affairs con-
cerns, and a strong dissent, led by Justice Sotomayor, called for an even 
heightened standard of review, i.e. one conditioning ideological exclusion 
based on evidence of compelling governmental interests. 
The Israeli Supreme Court, as I will discuss below, is still a novice in 
dealing with these intersections of free speech and immigration, and one 
could only hope that it will not revert to the unfortunate Mandel test, which 
is eroded even in the United States. It should be open to contemplate the 
opinions of the minority judges, not only the majority ones, both in Mandel 
and in Trump v. Hawaii.101 
Furthermore, the American experience proves how easy and dangerous 
it is to disregard the constitutional rights of foreigners and the people who 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88. 
101. The Supreme Court of Israel ruled, that at least certain aspects freedom of 
speech - among them political speech - are covered by Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty (See, e.g., HCJ 10203/03 "HamifkadHaleumi" Ltd. V. Attorney General, 62(4) 
PD 200, 215-218 (2008); the Avnery case, supra note 137) ("basic laws" being part of 
Israeli unique and incomplete constitution; See: Yoseph M. Edrey, The IsraeliConstitu-
tional Revolution/Evolution, Models of Constitutions, and a Lesson from Mistakes and 
Achievements, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 77 (2005)). Under Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, a governmental act or a statute, which violates a right protected by the basic 
law, could survive judicial review only if the violation was done for a proper purpose, 
and - furthermore - was proportionate. The Supreme Court has recognized three sub-
tests to examine the proportionality of the violation. "The first subtest is the rational 
connection test, which examines whether the legislation that violates the constitutional 
right is consistent with the purpose that it is intended to realize. The second subtest is 
the least harmful measure test. This test requires us to examine whether, of all the 
possible measures for realizing the purpose of the violating law, the measure that harms 
the protected constitutional right to the smallest possible degree was chosen. The third 
subtest is the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. This test requires the violation 
of the protected constitutional right to be reasonably commensurate with the social ad-
vantage that arises from the violation." (HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and 
Business v. Minister of Finance, 63(2) PD 545 (2009); for English translation: https:// 
supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/External.aspx/?&type=4). The "proper purpose" cri-
terion seems similar to the Mandelian "legitimate reason" standard. The first subset of 
the proportionality criterion resembles the "rational basis" standard of the majority 
opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, and the third subtest of the proportionality criterion resem-
bles the strict scrutiny standard advocated by the minority opinion s in Mandel and 
Trump v. Hawaii. 
102 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
wish to interact with them. Constitutional rights are supposed to be solid, 
and to resist ephemeral political atmosphere and changing public opinion. 
Unfortunately, when it comes to foreigners (including, sometimes, ances-
tors of foreigners), American jurisprudence has known some horrific dis-
plays of inhumanity towards them, and the case of ideological exclusion of 
foreigners interweaves with this alarming past and present. The ideological 
exclusion Articles, which were part of McCarran-Walter Act, were enacted 
during the Cold War era, and as part of McCarthyism. They were rescinded 
- after much criticism - at the end of the Cold War, but since then new 
initiatives of a similar background are being introduced as black letter 
American law. 
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court, explicitly for the first time, 
overruled the infamous 1944 Korematsu decision, 10 2 which allowed for the 
internment of people of Japanese descent (including ones who were Ameri-
can citizens) during World War II in the name of national security. How-
ever, Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, cautioned that by allowing the 
Trump Proclamation to remain intact "the Court redeploys the same danger-
ous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one 'gravely wrong' 
decision with another." 103 Israel should not blindly follow the American 
path of ideological exclusions. If anything, it should pay attention to the 
criticism of it from both within the U.S. and outside of it. 
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF CITIZENS AND ALIENS 
My analysis of the three Israeli case studies discussed in Part III below 
will rely on two distinct, yet related, axes. One axis is the location of the 
foreigner: outside of the country (wishing to enter) or inside the country 
(wishing to stay). The second axis is the citizen's vs. the foreigner's right to 
freedom of speech (either as a speaker or as a listener). 
The first axis is relevant, as countries around the world, including 
Israel, generally apply their laws, and bestow constitutional civil and politi-
cal rights, on a territorial or jurisdictional basis. That is, on any person pre-
sent within the geographical boundaries or jurisdiction of the state. 
Applying domestic laws to events occurring or persons outside of a state's 
territory or jurisdiction is the exception to the rule. Similarly, states gener-
ally apply their domestic laws - including basic civil and political human 
rights - on persons within the state's territory or jurisdiction, regardless of 
their civil status. This rule has exceptions, 104 but it is still the rule, at least 
102. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). 
103. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 28 (2018) (Sonia Sotomayor J., Dissenting). 
104. For example, according to international human rights law, the right to vote 
and be appointed to public office generally applies to citizens only, and not to foreign-
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with regard to the most basic human rights, freedom of expression in-
cluded. 105 Most domestic legal systems, as well as international human 
rights law, adhere to this principle of territoriality. 
The 14th Amendment of the American Constitution, for example, ex-
plicitly provides that "[n]o State shall .... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Most other rights, under the 
American Bill of Rights, are also conferred to "persons" rather than "citi-
zens." American courts were very clear in their differentiation between the 
bestowal of constitutional rights on foreigners who are present (whether 
legally or illegally) on American soil and the refusal to bestow such rights 
on foreigners who are subject to acts by American officials outside of 
American territory or jurisdiction. 106 For this very reason, the District Court 
ruled in the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. case mentioned 
above, that the ideological exclusion embedded in the McCarran-Walter 
Act was unconstitutional and void as far as it applies to foreigners within 
U.S. territory, but was valid insofar as foreigners abroad (wishing to enter 
the U.S.) were concerned. 107 
Similarly, in Israel, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty bestows 
most of the constitutional rights it refers to (including the non-enumerated 
ers residing in the country (see, e.g., Article 25 to the ICCPR). The exact constitutional 
protection that a country offers foreigners within its territory changes from country to 
country. For the U.S., see the enlightening account by Linda Bosniak, THE CITIZEN AND 
THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP ACCOUNT (2006) 49-69. 
105. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 
(1945). 
106. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional 
Rights as Citizens?, 25 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 365 (2003). In his concurring opin-
ion in Bridges v. Wixon, ibid at p. 161, Justice Murphy articulated this stand most 
clearly: "The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the 
first time to these shores. But, once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country, 
he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within 
our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments 
and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions 
acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their 
inalienable privileges to all 'persons,' and guard against any encroachment on those 
rights by federal or state authority." The Supreme Court of the United States has re-
cently reiterated this principle in Agency for InternationalDevelopment v. Alliancefor 
Open Society International,Inc., 591 U.S. __ (2020). 
107. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 
(1989). See supra note 64. For a discussion on non-Americans' right to free speech 
under U.S. law, see Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The PrecariousStatus of 
Non-Citizen Speech under the FirstAmendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. (2016). 
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freedom of speech 108) on "persons" rather than citizens 09 or residents. 110 In 
1Kav LaOved v. Ministry of Interior" Judge Procaccia ruled: 
The basic constitutional principles anchored in Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty are applicable to a foreign worker stay-
ing in Israel, and intend to protect his life, body, dignity, property, 
personal liberty, right to leave Israel, privacy and intimacy. At the 
center of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty stands the human 
being. 
The Basic Law applies, therefore, for its most part, on every person 
present in Israel, regardless of civil status, religion, activities, opinion etc. 1 2 
International human rights law (to be distinguished from other 
brunches of international law with universal application, such as interna-
tional criminal law) follows the same legal line. True, the European Con-
vention of Human Rights (1950) contains Article 16, which supposedly 
excludes aliens from freedom of speech protection.1 3 This Article has been, 
108. See, e.g., HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Company v. Film and Play Review 
Board, 50(5) IsrSC 661, 674-675 (1997) (holding that freedom of speech is a constitu-
tional right, as it is a component of human dignity, protected by the Basic Law). But See 
e.g., PPA 4463/94 Golan v. PrisonsService 50(4) PD 146, 190-192 (1996) (holding that 
while the freedom of speech is a basic right, and not only deduced from the right to 
dignity, since the right to freedom of speech is not listed in the Basic Law, only in-
fringement of the right that also infringes the right to dignity is prohibited by the Basic 
Law) 
109. Article 6(b) is the only article of the basic law that refers to "citizen" rather 
than "person"; it provides: "Every Israel citizen has the right of entry into Israel from 
abroad." 
110. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation refers to the rights of "residents," rather 
than "persons." 
111. HCJ 11437/05 Kav LaOved v. The Ministry of Interior (Apr. 13, 2011), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
112. Id. at 160. 
113. "Nothing in Articles 10 [freedom of expression], 11 [freedom of assembly 
and association] and 14 [prohibition of discrimination] shall be regarded as preventing 
the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of 
aliens." 
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however, unequivocally criticized by international law scholars1 4 and by 
the Council of Europe itself 115 As Juliane Kokot and Beate Rudolf wrote: 
The provision no longer reflects the present status of interna-
tional human rights law. Article 16 dates from a time when it was 
considered legitimate to restrict the political activities of aliens gener-
ally. The underlying rationale was that these activities were apt o 
disrupt a state's external relations. However, subsequent human 
rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Afri-
can Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, all do without such a 
clause. Legal writers had criticized the provision as being entirely 
without limits and thus hardly compatible with the system of the 
Convention. 116 
In Peringekv. Switzerland, a Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights basically adopted this legal stand.17 It mentioned the posi-
tion of the European Commission of Human Rights against Article 16, and 
observed that it 
has never been applied by .... the Court, and unbridled reliance on it 
to restrain the possibility for aliens to exercise their right to freedom 
114. See, e.g., Juan Fernando Durin Alba, Restrictions on the Political Activity of 
Aliens Under Article 16 ECHR, in EUROPE OF RIGHTS: A COMPENDIUM ON THE EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 497 (Javier Garcia Roca & Pablo Santolaya eds., 
2012); Juliane Kokott & Beate Rudolf, Piermont v. France, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 456, 
458-60 (1996) (claiming that Article 16 allowed for unfettered discretion and thus had 
to be interpreted in a way that will constrain discretion given to the Contracting Par-
ties); H6lene Lambert, The position of Aliens in Relation to the European Convention 
on Human Rights 25-26 (2007). 
115. In Recommendation 799 (1977) on the political rights and position of aliens, 
the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly called for Article 16 to be repealed 
(point 10 (c) of the recommendation). In Piermontv. France the Commission argued 
before the European Court of Human Rights that Article 16 reflects an outdated under-
standing of international law (see Piermont v. France, nos. 15773/89 and 15774/89, 
Commission's report of 20 January 1994, unpublished, § 58). 
116. Kokott & Rudolf, supra note 114, at 458. 
117. Peringek v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 121-22 (2015), https:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158235. This was the second case of the European Court 
of Human Rights to ever discuss Article 16, and the first and only one to date, to rule on 
its essence. In Piermont v. France, 314 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1995) the Court dis-
cussed a petition filed by a German member of the European Parliament, who argued 
that her freedom of expression was violated while she was visiting French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia. The Court ruled that Article 16 is inapplicable to a national of a 
member state of the EU (while visiting another member state), and particularly not to a 
member of the European Parliament. 
1
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of expression would run against the Court's rulings in cases in which 
aliens have been found entitled to exercise this right without any sug-
gestion that it could be curtailed by reference to Article 16. 
It then ruled that the Article should be interpreted restrictively as only 
capable of authorizing restrictions on "activities" that directly affect the po-
118litical process. 
Article 16 of the European Convention of Human Rights is, indeed, in 
variance with current international human rights law. The International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  9 - which protects, 
among other rights, freedom of expression, 120 and which has been ratified 
by a high number of states worldwide - is clear about the signatory states' 
responsibility to protect the rights of every person within its territory: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, nationalor social origin, property, birth or 
121other status. 
The principle of territorial or jurisdictional application applies in spe-
cific areas of international human rights law as well, including in the field 
of immigration. For example, while a state is obliged, under the Refugee 
Convention, to protect and bestow rights on refugees within their territory 
or jurisdiction, it is not obliged to assist refugees or displaced people 
outside of it.122 
118. The grand chamber uled that Peringek, a Turkish political figure who was 
convicted by a Swiss Court for publicly denying the Armenian genocide, is entitled to 
Article 10 protection, as Article 16 does not apply to the case according to the above-
mentioned limited interpretation of it. Hence, the Grand Chamber ruled in favor of 
Peringek, and held that he should have not been indicted by the Swiss authorities to 
begin with. It is not clear what counts as an activity which directly affects the political 
process. Christoph Grabenwarter, an Austrian legal scholar and the Vice President of 
the Austrian Constitutional Court, suggested that a foreigner wishing to become the 
leader of a major party might serve as an exception to that rule. Christoph 
Grabenwarter, Reception ofMigrants:Material and ProceduralGuaranteesfor Settled 
Migrants 4 (European Court of Human Rights Seminar, 2017), https:// 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20170127_Grabenwarter_JY_ENG.pdf. 
119. Israel signed and ratified. 
120. ICCPR, art. 19. 
121. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added). 
122. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 
26-27 (2d ed. 2014) (" .... even the most basic refugee rights can be claimed only once 
a refugee comes under the jurisdiction of a state party."). 
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Moreover, the notion that whomever is in a country's territory is enti-
tled to constitutional rights is not only ingrained in domestic legal systems 
and international law; it is also supported in the writings of some leading 
political theorists. One of them is Linda Bosniak, who coined the term "eth-
ical territoriality" to reflect the ethical conviction that aliens should be enti-
tled to legal rights ordinarily bestowed by the host country to its citizens, by 
their mere presence in that country. 123 
One complexity should, however, be mentioned: that of the physical 
versus the legal presence of the foreigner in the country of destination. 
Some states, among them the United States 124 and Israel,125 sometimes em-
ploy a legal fiction, according to which a person could be on the state's soil 
yet - as she was not yet admittedinto the country (e.g. is in the airport, not 
allowed to pass through immigration control) - considered to be outside of 
it. Such a person, fictitiously considered to be outside of the country's terri-
tory, is therefore doomed undeserving of certain constitutional protections. 
This legal fiction has, however, never been adopted by international human 
rights law. 1 2 6 
Political theorists also reject this fiction of physically present yet le-
gally absent, and some of them convincingly argue that these aliens are 
entitled to constitutional protection despite their short stay in the country of 
destination. True, the "affiliation" argument, which holds that migrants' 
rights are based on the ethical weight given to migrants' attachment to the 
country where they actually live in (its culture, inhabitants, etc.) cannot 
stand for these aliens. They did not, after all, stay in the country of destina-
123. See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territorialityand the Rights of Im-
migrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007). 
124. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
For a discussion of the fiction in American law see: Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial 
Distinction, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 407 (2002). 
125. See HCJ 7302/07 Hotline for Migrant Workers v. Minister of Defense (July 
7, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (A petition submitted by a 
number of human rights organizations that seeks to examine Israel's policy regarding 
"pushing back" (i.e. deporting) to Egypt of groups of foreigners - among them, poten-
tially, asylum seekers - immediately upon their entry by foot into Israeli territory. The 
High Court of Justice rejected the petition because the State has decided to suspend the 
implementation of the said policy). 
126. See, e.g., Hathaway and Foster, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (2nd ed., 
2014) 23 ; Tally Kritzman-Amir & Thomas Spijkerboer, On the Morality and Legality 
of Borders: Border Policies and Asylum Seekers, 26 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 10-28 
(2013) (discussing various aspects of the Non-refoulement principle as the source for 
the principle of non-rejection at the border, while citing relevant case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights); PlaintiffM61 and PlaintiffM69 v. Commonwealth of 
Australia, [2010] HCA 41; Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
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tion long enough to develop any meaningful connection to it.127 However, 
the "jurisdiction" or "mutuality of obligation" 128 argument, which believes 
that if a state has authority (i.e. legal power) over a person then that person 
should correlatively hold certain legal rights to protect her from that state's 
power, applies to any person subordinated by that power, no matter what 
her legal status in that country is, and the length of her stay in it. 
To conclude on this point, which might, in the context of this article, 
relate to airport detainees, I will argue that an alien has an independent right 
to freedom of speech (i.e. not dependent on the right of her would-be listen-
ers) from the moment she sets foot in the territory of the country of destina-
tion. 129 A country which is disturbed by the idea of yielding such a right to 
foreigners, is free to use the well-recognized non-entrde method of visa re-
quirement and airline companies responsibility for visa inspection in the 
country of origin,130 with its limitations (smuggling) and costs (e.g. foreign 
affairs concerns and disruption of incoming tourism). 
So far, we discussed the first axis, which revolves around the for-
eigner. The "inside/ outside country of destination" dichotomy is irrelevant, 
after all, to citizens who wish to exercise their constitutional rights, as they 
are free to enter their own country, 131 where they could exercise their rights, 
whatever they are. The second axis, in contrast, relates both to the citizen 
and the foreigner who engage, or wish to engage, in a conversation in the 
citizen's country. 
Since freedom of speech protects, among other things, open communi-
cation, and as communication involves at least two persons (the speaker and 
the listener, who might constantly change roles), both sides could invoke 
their putative right to freedom of speech against a governmental curtailment 
of it. Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to listen to someone 
127. Bosniak, supra note 123, at 405-06. 
128. NEUMAN, supra note 2, at 97-117. 
129. However, given the fact that some of the rationales (i.e. the attachment one) 
for bestowing that right on "physically present" aliens do not stand for short term visi-
tors, such aliens' right to freedom of speech could be more easily overridden by a 
compelling governmental interest, as compared to the right of an alien who has been 
long term resident in the country. Yet, the right is accorded to the short-term visitor as 
well, and a compelling governmental interest must be shown in order to override it, in 
the least restrictive manner. 
130. See, e.g., Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement in a World of 
Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, at 244-245 (2015). 
131. Article 12(4) to ICCPR. For Israeli law, see Article 6(b) to Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty. For American law, see Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 US 
53, 67 (2001): "Congress is well within its authority in refusing .... to commit this 
country to embracing a child as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the 
United States, to the absolute right to enter its borders ..... " (emphasis added). 
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else's monologue and the right to gather information. 132 This insight is es-
pecially relevant when the speaker is a foreigner, wishing to enter another 
country for the purpose of communicating with a listener, who is a citizen 
of that country. While the foreigner cannot - as explained above - claim 
a right to enter that country, regardless of her wish to express herself there 
(neither by most countries' domestic constitutional law nor by international 
human rights law), the local citizen can invoke her own right to listen to the 
foreigner, under the auspices of the right to freedom of speech, as a reason 
to allow the foreigner in. 133 To complicate things, I will add that the citi-
zenry, and not only a particular citizen, might also have a collective right 
that the government would not suppress speech based on its political con-
tent, as part of its collective right to self-governance. I will elaborate on this 
point shortly. 
Consider the case of Mandel: American would-be listeners, such as 
Stanford University, asked the Federal government to let Mandel in, so that 
they, not Mandel, could exercise their right to free speech, by listening to 
him. The American Supreme Court indeed acknowledged that the American 
respondents' constitutional right to freedom of speech was restrained and 
therefore found they had standing. It further rejected the Government's 
stance that the Court owed absolute deference to the Executive in visa de-
nial cases, even when the denial supposedly violates the constitutional 
132. See, e.g., in Israel, HCJ 243/62 IsraelMovie Studios Ltd. v. Greg, 16 PD 
2407, 2414-2415 (1962). 
133. What about the citizen's right to speak before the foreigner in the citizen's 
own country? In other words, can a citizen-speaker demand the entry of a foreigner-
listener to her country, in the name of her (the citizen's) right to freedom of speech? For 
example, can a university invoke its right to freedom of speech in order to admit a 
foreigner into the country as an audience member, ather than as a speaker in a confer-
ence that it arranges? Here are some preliminary thoughts on this matter. First, most 
often there is no real dichotomy between the speaker and the listener of a conversation, 
as they constantly change roles. So the question becomes limited to rare cases in which 
the foreigner is a "pure" listener. In these rare cases, the foreigner who is out of the 
country cannot invoke her own right "to listen" (and enter the foreign country for that 
sake), and the question becomes, as mentioned: can the local speaker claim a right to 
speak face-to-face before a foreigner, hence justifying the entry of the foreigner for that 
cause. I think the right could potentially be invoked; however, it might not be strong 
enough to overcome governmental interests, compared to the right to listen to a for-
eigner. The question is what is the value of "purely" speaking in front of a foreigner that 
justifies her entry into the country, if there are governmental interests against it. There 
could be cases in which speaking before an audience of aliens carries special value: for 
example, when the mere presence of the foreigner-listener in the foreign country carries 
a symbolic (expressive) value or when the main aim of the citizen-speaker in her speech 
is to target or influence the foreigner-listener qua foreigner. 
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rights of American citizens - such as prospective listeners, who wish to 
listen to the foreigners. Yet, the Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny 
standard that it regularly applies when reviewing governmental acts that 
infringe on citizens' freedom of speech. Instead, it used the "facially legiti-
mate and bona fide" standard of review - without explaining its source.13 4 
As mentioned above, years later - in the Trump v. Hawaii case - the 
Court agreed, based on the Government's own accession, to use the only 
slightly broader rational basis standard. 
On its face, one could think of reasons to advocate for a more limited 
standard of review in the discussed type of governmental action - i.e., 
barring the entry of foreign speakers despite its effect on would-be local 
"listeners" - in the name of immigration control. In Mandel, Justice 
Blackmun, writing for the majority, engaged with this matter. He wrote: 
Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to 
withhold a waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made 
that American citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable 
under §212(a)(28), one of two unsatisfactory results would necessa-
rily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the ple-
nary discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive becomes 
a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh the 
strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in 
refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some 
as yet undetermined standard. The dangers and the undesirability of 
making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size of 
the audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas are obvious. Indeed, 
it is for precisely this reason that the waiver decision has, properly, 
been placed in the hands of the Executive." 
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, responded as follows: 
I do not mean to suggest that, simply because some Americans 
wish to hear an alien speak, they can automatically compel even his 
temporary admission to our country. Government may prohibit aliens 
from even temporary admission if exclusion is necessary to protect a 
compelling governmental interest. Actual threats to the national se-
curity, public health needs, and genuine requirements of law enforce-
ment are the most apparent interests that would surely be compelling. 
But, in Dr. Mandel's case, the Government has, and claims, no such 
compelling interest. Mandel's visit was to be temporary. His "ineligi-
bility" for a visa was based solely on §212(a)(28). The only govern-
134. As Justice Marshall wrote in his dissent: "No citation is given for this kind of 
unprecedented deference to the Executive, nor can I imagine (nor am I told) the slight-
est justification for such a rule." Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777-78 (1972). 
135. Id. at 768-69. 
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mental interest embodied in that section is the Government's desire to 
keep certain ideas out of circulation in this country. This is hardly a 
compelling governmental interest. Section (a)(28) may not be the ba-
sis for excluding an alien when Americans wish to hear him. Without 
any claim that Mandel "live" is an actual threat to this country, there 
is no difference between excluding Mandel because of his ideas and 
keeping his books out because of their ideas. Neither is permitted.136 
With all due respect, Justice Marshall's minority opinion seems to be 
sounder; and I could therefore only hope that Israeli Courts, becoming more 
and more engaged these days in this matter of ideological exclusion of for-
eigners, would endorse his - rather than Justice Blackmun's - view. Jus-
tice Blackmun warns that the application of the strict standard of review, 
regularly applied in First Amendment cases, would lead to a disastrous out-
come, in which either the Executive loses its authority over immigration 
altogether, or that the Executive and the Court are forced to delve into the 
impossible task of assessing the value and importance of the speech. Yet the 
first scenario is unfounded, and the second ignores decades of judicial bal-
ancing between the right to free speech and compelling governmental inter-
ests. Let me explain. 
Regarding the loss of the Executive's authority over immigration: first, 
the authority of the Executive in a democratic society - or, more precisely, 
the discretionary exercise of such authority - indeed becomes more lim-
ited when it collides with a constitutional right of a person, and specifically 
freedom of speech. This is true of any authority, including the authority 
over public safety, public order and public health - just to name a few -
and the authority over immigration is no different. 
Second, as Justice Blackmun correctly observed, the tension between 
immigration control and free speech rights arises when a citizen makes a 
bonafide claim that she wishes to engage in a discussion with a foreigner. It 
is the Executive's job to decide whether a claim is bonafide or not, and the 
Judiciary seldom interferes with the fact-finding process and outcome of the 
Executive in constitutional litigation. Just as immigration authorities deal 
with sham marriages, between a citizen and an alien, so they can and should 
deal with sham dialogues. And just as the real risk of sham marriages does 
not preclude family reunification, so the risk of false-conferences, for exam-
ple, should not lead to the disregard of the authentic wish of decent citizens 
to engage in a discourse with foreign speakers. Moreover, there is no reason 
to expect a scenario in which countless unwanted immigrants flood the 
streets of the U.S (or Israel) by conspiring with local citizens who deceive 
136. Id. at 783-84. 
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the immigration authorities that they intend to engage in discourse with 
them. 
Third, the right to listen and engage in conversation, as most human 
rights, in not absolute. If immigration control is a compelling governmental 
interest, and indeed I think it is, under current international legal order, then 
it could - in particular circumstances - override the constitutional right 
of the local "listeners." This leads me to respond to Justice Blackmun's 
second concern, that balancing between the constitutional right and the gov-
ernmental compelling interest would inevitably result in the government's 
taking into considerations "factors such as the size of the audience or the 
probity of the speaker's ideas." Justice Blackmun, however, ignores the fact 
that courts already engage in the craft of balancing when, for example, free-
dom of speech interferes with public safety, public order or other govern-
mental compelling interest, or when it collides with someone else's 
constitutional right (e.g. her right to privacy or freedom of movement). 
Courts developed rules for the balancing of interests in such cases, and an 
expertise in implementing them. They established, for example, a different 
level of protection for different types of speech (political, artistic and com-
mercial). 137 They also adopted different tests for balancing between the 
competing interests (e.g., the "clear and present danger" test in enticement 
cases).138 Of course, there are hard cases and borderline cases, but the legal 
rules and precedents already exist, and courts and the Executive have 
gained decades of judicial experience in the art of balancing, in both the 
United States and Israel. There is no reason that things would be different 
when the governmental interest is immigration control. 
Take, for example, an alien who wishes to enter the country in order to 
attend a conference. Can the Executive refuse to grant her a visa for the sole 
reason that the conference is expected to be critical of the government? I 
would answer in an emphatic "no." This seem to follow even from Mandel, 
as the wish to suppress political criticism is not a "facially legitimate" rea-
son for refusing entry of foreigners, and this was the ruling of Judge Baron 
in the Alqasem case discussed below. 139 Even if foreigner herself has no 
right to enter, the local audience has a right to listen to this criticism, as 
discussed above in detail. As ruled in Police Departmentv. Mosley, "above 
137. See, e.g., HCJ 5239/11 Uri Avnery et al v. The Knesset et al., 71 (Apr. 15, 
2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew); Virginia State Pharmacy 
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 764 (1976) (overruling 
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) and holding that "[g]eneralizing, society 
also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information."). 
138. See, e.g., Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (United States); 73/53 
"Kol Haam" v. Minister of Interior, 7 P.O. 871 (1953) (Isr.). 
139. Supra note 14. 
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all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its 
content."14 0 Indeed, "viewpoint discrimination"1 4 1 is an unconstitutional in-
fringement of freedom of speech. Just as the government cannot block a 
foreign internet site or ban the import of a book based solely on its content, 
with very few exceptions, so it cannot ban the entry of a foreigner just 
because of what idea she might express while in the country. After all, one 
of the rationales of freedom of speech is fostering public deliberation on 
political matters, as a pre-requisite for self-governance.142 Banning the anti-
governmental foreigner is, therefore, an infringement of the citizenry's right 
to be exposed, eagerly or not, to a relevant and not necessarily valid 
opinion. 
Now, consider that the alien who came to attend the conference wishes 
to extend the three months entry visa, that she - like most visitors to Israel 
- got upon entering the country, so that she could become more involved 
in her political activism in Israel. If the government refuses to renew her 
visa due to the concern that longer periods of stay might lead to a settlement 
of the foreigner in the country, which the state wishes to prevent, then this 
is supposedly a compelling governmental interest which would apply to the 
"political" immigrant as well. To legally compel the government to prolong 
her visa, she and her local allies would have to establish that the freedom of 
speech concerns, associated with her prolonged stay, outweigh the compel-
ling governmental interest in immigration control, and that therefore there is 
a justification to give her a "special treatment" concerning the length of 
stay. This argument would probably not be an easy one to make. Armed 
with such theoretical and doctrinal background, let us now analyze the three 
Israeli cases described above. 
III. IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN ISRAEL: THREE CASE STUDIES 
Israeli jurisprudence on immigration, like its American counterpart, 
underlines the notion of SEP. Countless court decisions stressed that the 
Israeli government, and the Minister of Interior in particular, hold very 
broad discretionary power in matters of immigration.14 3 However, Israeli 
Courts also stressed that broad power in the realm of immigration does not 
140. Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); for a similar ruling in 
Israel see CA 751/10 Ploni v. Dayan, 38 (Feb. 8, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew). 
141. Kent Greenawalt, O'Er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 
UCLA L. REv. 925, 931-32 (1990). 
142. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28 (1960). 
143. See, e.g., HCJ 758/88 Kendall v. Ministerof Interior,46(4) PD 505 (1992). 
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mean absolute power. 144 Like in the U.S., Israeli precedents hold that con-
stitutional considerations may, at times, support applications for entry and 
continued stay of aliens in the country, either based on the aliens' indepen-
dent constitutional rights (at least in cases of continued stay), 14 or based on 
citizens' constitutional rights, which indirectly enable entry or continued 
stay of "piggybacking" aliens. However, and despite the Levy case men-
tioned above,14 6 Israeli Knesset and Courts, as will be discussed below, do 
not always recognize the effect which Israelis' freedom of expression bears 
on allowing the entry or continued stay of aliens with whom they dialogue, 
and definitely overlook the independent right of aliens themselves to free-
dom of speech in Israel (in cases in which the alien is already in the coun-
try). To demonstrate this contention, I will analyze three case studies from 
the last decade. 
The first discussed case below, that of a Messianic Jew who was de-
ported for holding a sign in support of "Jews for Jesus," is an intriguing and 
- I will argue - disturbing case, in which the freedom of speech perspec-
tive, including the right of Israeli citizens to interact with the foreign Messi-
anic Jew, was completely absent from the judicial analysis of all three 
instances adjudicating the case. 
The second case study is that of the Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Fami-
lies for Peace, which petitioned the High Court of Justice in 2018, and once 
again in 2019, against he Ministry of Defense's decision to deny entry of 
Palestinian bereaved families to enter Israel in order to participate in an 
alternative Memorial Day ceremony annually held in Tel Aviv, side by side 
with the Israeli bereaved families. In both its 2018 and 2019 decisions, I
will argue, the Court correctly allowed the Palestinian bereaved families 
into the country. Yet, most of the Court's reasoning in 2018 revolved 
around administrative law considerations of "reasonableness," while ignor-
ing the bereaved families' joint expressive activity and the constitutional 
defense it is entitled to. This might be the reason that the Ministry of De-
fense decided again to prevent entry of the Palestinian bereaved families a 
year later. In the second ruling, the Court finally used clear freedom of 
expression reasoning and terminology. 
Finally, I will discuss the 2017 Anti-BDS immigration law, and the 
litigation that it generated so far. Here, too, I will contend, the "right to 
listen" of Israelis was not given the full normative power that is due. 
144. AdminA 1038/08 State of Israel v. Javitz, (Aug 11, 2009), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew), at 21. 
145. See, e.g., HCJ 11437/05 Kav LaOved v. The Ministry of Interior, (Apr. 13, 
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
146. Supra note 13. 
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A. The Messianic Jew Case 
Barry Martin Lawrence Barnett is a UK national born in 1963, and a 
self-identified Messianic Jew. He entered Israel with a three-month B/2 
"tourist" visa in November 2013. Such a visa is issued to a person who 
"wishes to enter Israel for a visit or any other purpose, which requires only 
a short sojourn in Israel, provided that it is not for the purpose of work, 
whether for remuneration or not."1 4 7 
Two weeks later (and several days before his flight back to the UK 
was scheduled for) Barnett was inspected in a cross-road in Southern Israel 
holding a sign which said: "Yeshu-Yeshua-Yeshuah," a Hebrew slogan 
used by Messianic Jews in Israel, which emphasized the Hebrew origin of 
the name of Jesus, and its denotation to salvation, and handing out leaflets. 
Three Israelis took part in the same activity with Barnett. 
What caused the immigration inspectors to arrive to the place and 
check Barnett's papers, is unclear. Two inspectors wrote "activity re-
ports" 148 concerning Barnett's initial hold up, but none disclosed what 
brought them to the scene to begin with. Inspector Assaf wrote that the 
inspection team, consisting of four inspectors, "observed two couples stand-
ing with 'Yeshu-Yeshua-Yeshuah' placards," but did not elaborate if they 
noticed the four in a routine or haphazard drive by, or if they came there 
based on a specific call. Inspector Azran wrote that the inspection was a 
"proactive activity," but did not elaborate on the source and reason for this 
proactivity. The doubt is being raised here since instances of "ratting" to the 
authorities on activities of Messianic Jews - a highly unpopular group in 
147. Article 5 to the Entry to Israel Regulations, 1974. 
148. On file with author. 
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the eyes of Israeli authorities and public 149 - is a well-documented phe-
nomenon in Israel. 150 
149. See, e.g., Pauline Kollontai, Messianic Jews and Jewish Identity, 3 J. MOD-
ERN JEWISH STUDIES 195, 201-213 (2004) (opposition to Messianic Jews from within 
the Jewish communities and Israel and the U.S, documenting also violent attacks 
against Messianic Jewish synagogues by other Jews); Temar Zieve, Will Israel Ever 
Accept Messianic Jews?, JERUSALEM POST (16 Dec. 2017), https://www.jpost.com/ 
Israel-News/Diaspora-Affairs-Will-Israel-ever-accept-Messianic-Jews-518129. The Su-
preme Court ruled in HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of Interior, 43(4) PD 793 
(1987) that Messianic Jews, even if Jewish under Halacha (Jewish Law) are not entitled 
to naturalization under the Law of Return. See also Aaron R. Petty, The Concept of 
Religion in the Supreme Courtof Israel, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 211, 249-54 (review 
of the opinions delivered by Deputy President of the Supreme Court, Judge Elon, and 
by Judge Barak); Yaacov Ben-Shemesh, The Law and the Shaping ofNationalMemory: 
The Case of Messianic Jews, 10 ALEI MISHPAT 177 (2012) (Isr.) (examining Deputy 
President Elon's opinion thoroughly and claiming that Elon's grasp on Judaism is sub-
jective and contingent). See also, e.g., HCJ 8735/06 Comforti v. Council of the Chief 
Rabbinate of Israel, Tak-SC 2009(2) 4347 (holding that the Council of the Chief 
Rabbinate of Israel was wrong to take into consideration the fact that the appellant is a 
Messianic Jew, thus refusing to grant her bakery a Kashrut certification); File No. 3060/ 
02 Administrative Court (Jer), David Stern v. PalestinePostLtd. (Nov. 11, 2003), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (A 2:1 holding that the respondent, the 
sole Israeli daily newspaper being published in English at that time, may discriminate 
against Messianic Jews and refrain from publishing ads concerning them); File No. 
16166-01-11 Administrative Court (Jer), Danur v. Ministry of Interior (Jan. 8, 2012), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that the Ministry of Inte-
rior, in denying her application for citizenship, was wrong to take into consideration the 
fact that the applicant, who married an Israeli citizen, is a Messianic Jew); File No. 
5716-11-10 Administrative Court (Jer), Henson et al. v. Ministry of Interior (June 23, 
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that the respondent 
was wrong to take into consideration a loosely based report regarding the applicants' 
alleged missionary activity while denying their request for a Clergy visa); File No. 
11624-12-15 Hodous et al. v. Vasilio events Ltd. (Feb. 1, 2017), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding of damages against the owner of a wedding 
venue who refused to service a Messianic couple); File No. 2979-17 Court of Appeals 
of The Entry into Israel Law, 1952, Van der Valt v. Population and Immigration Au-
thority (Dec. 5, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that 
the Ministry of Interior mustn't decline appellants' request for a tourist permit solely 
because of the fact that they are Messianic Jews who have organized tours in Israel for 
over 20 years). 
150. "Yad L'Achim," a non-governmental organization, operates a hotline in 
which people can notify the organization of missionary activities all around the country. 
The organization's background and mission, as described in its website is as follows: 
"Yad L'Achim was established in 1950 to help new immigrants adjust to the newly 
born country and to help them find a suitable religious framework. It is a non-profit 
organization with no political affiliation. Over the years, its attention has turned to more 
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Inspector Assaf's report describes the placards, that the four (two Is-
raeli men, one Israeli woman and Barnett) were holding, their dismay with 
the inspectors' intervention in their protest, and Barnett's agreement to go 
with the inspectors to the immigration station, after his initial refusal. He 
ends his report with the words: "It should be noted that the foreigner [Bar-
nett] is a B/2 tourist who violated his visa by handing out flyers and holding 
signs intended for religious persuasion (Jesus)." 
Inspector Azran wrote in her report that Barnett was also wearing a T-
shirt with a "Jews for Jesus" slogan, and handed out a leaflet titled "Jesus 
saved me," a copy of which she attached to her activity report. She wrote: 
"I asked [Barnett] what was the purpose of his visit in Israel and he replied 
that he came on vacation and for volunteering for the non-profit organiza-
tion for whom he held the signs.. . . he further argued that he does not get 
any money for it." 
In the station, Barnett underwent what was supposed to be a hearing 
regarding MOI's intention to revoke his visa51 The "hearing" form states 
the following (syntax and punctuation errors in origin; author's translation): 
Elaboration of facts: B/2 tourist engaged in messianic activity. 
Content of the hearing: On 20/11/13 in Tel Sheva junction the 
aforementioned held signs in which it was stated who wants to join 
the faith of Jesus. Also handed out flyers to bypassers. 
Decision: Revocation of B/2 visa. 
Foreigner's response to revocation of his visa: I have nothing to 
say. 
In another form, "Announcement of visa revocation," issued appar-
ently following the "hearing," the given reason for the visa revocation is 
complex problems, including how to counter the missionary threat . . . . Fighting the 
missionaries, who have millions of dollars a year at their disposal, has long been one 
of Yad L'Achim's top priorities." http://yadlachim.org/?CategoryID=188. It operates a 
"counter missionary department," the activities of which is described as follows: "We 
fight the missionaries in a variety of ways, some of which, due to their sensitive nature, 
can't be described in detail. One of our most important functions is to track the activi-
ties of missionaries and respond to them in appropriate ways." http://yadlachim.org/ 
?CategoryID=196&ArticleID=554 
151. Actually, it was not much of a hearing, as Barnett was asked to respond after, 
rather than before the decision to revoke the visa was taken. 
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"messianic activity." Another form, a deportation order, states that Barnett 
is barred from entering Israel for a period of ten years.112 
Following the "hearing" regarding his visa revocation, Barnett under-
went a second hearing, this time regarding his possible detention until de-
portation. In this hearing he was asked why he held the signs, and replied: 
"I believe that Jesus is the Messiah, and wish to join people in." At the end 
of the hearing the MOI's decision is "to keep [Barnett] in custody until 
deportation - messianic activity." Because of his detention, Barnett missed 
the pre-scheduled flight back to the UK, that he purchased in advance. 
The custody tribunal, which heard Barnett's case four days later,15 
wrote that the Ministry of Interior revoked Barnett's visa "after it found that 
he was engaged in missionary activity - spreading the ideas of Messianic 
Jews." However, in the oral hearing before the tribunal, the MOI gave for 
the first time an additional reason for the visa revocation and deportation 
order: Barnett was not a tourist, but rather worked or volunteered for a 
nonprofit organization (whose flyers he handed out) without obtaining the 
proper visa. 1 4 Barnett violated, MOI claimed, Article 5(d) of the Entrance 
to Israel Regulations, which provides that "a person wishing to enter Israel 
in order to temporarily work without remuneration would apply for a visa 
and a B/4 type of a visit permit (volunteer)." Barnett, it should be recalled, 
held a B/2 (tourist) rather than a B/4 (volunteer) visa when he entered the 
country. 
Barnett's lawyer argued before the custody tribunal that Barnett was 
merely exercising his right to freedom of expression, protected by the 
United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) Global Code of 
Ethics for Tourism,155 which Israel has signed. 156 The judge disregarded the 
argument. He ruled that "without delving into the criminal implication of 
152. There is a default rule of ten-year ban on re-entry of a person who was de-
ported from Israel. See section B.2.1 to MOI procedure 5.4.0001 on issuing of B/2 
(Visitor) visas. 
153. File No. 1486185 Immigration Detention Review Tribunal (Give'on) (Nov. 
24, 2013). 
154. As mentioned above, inspector Azran did write in her activity report that 
Barnett mentioned volunteering as one of his reasons for the visit, and the matter was 
also mentioned in Barnett's pre-detention hearing. However, this matter was NOT men-
tioned as a reason for the visa revocation, deportation and detention. 
155. http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/docpdf/gcetbrochureglobalcodeen.pdf 
156. The code, however, is not a legally binding instrument. A better reference 
would, therefore, be to Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (right to freedom of expression), in conjunction with Article 2(1) ("Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory."). 
2019-2020] IdeologicalExclusion 119 
the detainee's alleged activities" he would release Barnett from custody, as 
he was convinced that Barnett would leave Israel on his own. He set a bail, 
ordered Barnett to leave the country within ten days, and clarified that Bar-
nett "would not engage in prohibited missionary activity until he leaved 
Israel." It should be noted, that Israeli law does not prohibit persuading a 
person to proselytize, as long as the person is an adult, and the persuasion 
does not involve any financial or material return. 157 It was never argued that 
Barnett did either of the two. 
After Barnett left Israel, he filed a petition with the Administrative 
Court to cancel the MOI ten years reentry ban. MOI's principal reasoning 
now was that Barnett volunteered for a non-profit, and therefore should 
have obtained a volunteer (B/4) visa, and not a tourist (B/2) visa. Barnett's 
lawyer objected to this shift in reasoning, and relied on Supreme Court 
precedents, holding that Courts would be suspicious towards a new reason-
ing, which the Executive did not give at the time of the decision (i.e. prior 
to litigation).158 
The Administrative Court overlooked MOI's shifting in arguments. It 
stated that in the MOI pre-detention hearing, Barnett said that he entered 
Israel "in order to persuade people to join the faith and support of Jesus," 
but he admitted that in the border control of Ben Gurion airport he declared 
that he came on a vacation; and that he further admitted in the hearing that 
his accommodation in Israel was covered by the NGO whose flyers he dis-
seminated. "Under these circumstances," the judge concluded, "there is a 
factual basis for the respondent's finding that the petitioner indeed worked 
- either for free or for remuneration, in opposition to his declaration in the 
border that he came on vacation." 15 9 Hence, the petition was denied. An 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel was dismissed for the same reason. 
Also, in the meantime, the MOI has allowed Barnett to re-enter the country 
after depositing money as a guarantee to leaving the country on time and 
with a declaration that he would not engage in prohibited proselytization, a 
fact that made the original deportation order more proportionate in the 
Court's view. 160 
As I see things, we have here a case of a foreigner who engaged in an 
expressive activity with Israelis. His engagement was, first, with the three 
157. Art. 174A, 368 Penal Law, 5737-1977. 
158. HCJ 517/72, Snowerest (Israel) Ltd. v. Mayor of Bnei Brak 27(1) P.D. 
632(1973). For a similar doctrine, as applied in the UK in deportation proceedings, ee 
Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 Q.B. 243, 302. 
159. AdminC (Cr.) 11986-02-14 Barnett v. Populationand ImmigrationAuthority 
et al. 4 (Apr. 20, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
160. AdminA 3919/14 Barnett v. Population and Immigration Authority et al. 4 
(June 18, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
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Israelis he held up signs with, and with the "Jews for Jesus" Israeli branch, 
with whom he grouped. Indeed, people often associate to advance shared 
beliefs and programs, and the constitutional right of freedom of expression 
protects such kind of activity. 161 Second, with the Israeli public: the ones he 
handed out leaflets to (and possibly engaged in conversation with) and the 
drivers who drove by and saw his sign in the Tel Sheva junction. 
As Barnett was present in Israel at the time of his apprehension, and 
not just wishing to enter the country from abroad, he himself had a pro-
tected right to freedom of speech, as a speaker, wishing to express himself 
and influence the public debate on this religious matter in Israel.162 Moreo-
ver, Barnett held a valid tourist visa when he was engaging in the demon-
stration, a visa that the immigration authorities revoked thereafter. 
According to a long-standing doctrine of Israeli administrative law,16 3 the 
Executive must be more cautious in revoking a permit as compared to re-
fusing to grant a permit to begin with, or refusing to renew one. 
Apart from Barnett's own rights, there are also the rights of the other 
Messianic Jews and citizens of Israel to associate with him, and engage 
together in awareness raising and persuasion for their common belief. Of 
special importance here is the fact the Messianic Jews are a religious minor-
ity, extremely unpopular in Israel. 164 Freedom of speech jurisprudence di-
rects the authorities to protect and defend the views of unpopular groups 
with special determination and decisiveness. 165 Additionally, there is the 
right of Israeli "listeners" to see the signs, read the leaflets and be con-
vinced (or not) by them. 
The three instances that discussed Barnett's case were completely 
blind to all these considerations. Somehow, the ordinarily highly applauded 
principle of freedom of expression - of Barnett, of his fellow Israeli Mes-
sianic Jews, and of the Israeli public - was completely overlooked. None 
of the judges of the three instances asked themselves, why did the immigra-
tion officers come to the remote Tel Sheva junction to begin with. could it 
161. See in the U.S.: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 
(1958). 
162. See supra note 156 (on Article 19 of the ICCPR); supra notes 108-110 and 
accompanying text (on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). 
163. HCJ 113/52 Zacks v. Minister of Trade and Industry, 6(1) IsrSC 696, 700 
(1952); HCJ 799/80 Shlalam v. Licensing Officer Pursuanto the FirearmsLaw, 36(1) 
IsrSC 317, 327 (1981). In AdminA 7216/18 LaraAlqasem v. Immigrationand Popula-
tion Authority, para. 17 (Oct. 18, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in He-
brew) Judge Hendel gave a restrictive application to this doctrine in matters of entry 
visas. 
164. See supra note 149. 
165. Hague v. Comm. For Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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be religious profiling 166 - or even worse: religious harassment?; why did 
they question and apprehend him despite the fact that he showed them a 
valid tourist visa?; and why did the Ministry of Interior not mention the "B/ 
4 (volunteer) vs. B/2 (tourist) visa" argument in the early correspondence it 
had with Barnett's lawyer? Instead of dealing with these weighty questions, 
the court either clung to the formalistic matter of the type of visa Barnett 
held; 167 or even worse, unfoundedly and erroneously insinuated 168 that Bar-
nett's expression was "missionary" and therefore illegal-an insinuation 
that by itself buttresses the claim of harassment of Messianic Jews in Israel. 
In my opinion, the circumstances surrounding Barnett's visa revoca-
tion, detention and deportation are alarming. The fact hat the judicial sys-
tem did not pay any attention to the arguments that Barnett's lawyer made 
- i.e. that his client was deported due to his views - is disturbing. The 
evidence supports Barnett's argument, but all three instances refused to ex-
amine it, and to acknowledge that this seems to be a clear case of religious 
harassment. 
Even under the Mandelian extremely low (and highly criticized) stan-
dard of review, the acts of the authorities in the Barnett case, with their 
transgression on freedom of speech, seem to be unconstitutional. The rea-
son given by the Israeli authorities for deporting Barnett, just like the rea-
sons given by the American authorities for refusing the entry of Mandel, 
was visa violation. This could very well be a "facially legitimate" reason, as 
the Mandel court indeed ruled. However, the full Mandeliantest talks about 
"a facially legitimate and bona fide reason." Can the authorities, which ini-
166. File No. 11387-09-14 Regional Labor Court (TA), State of IsraelPopulation 
and ImmigrationAuthority v. Erez Rubinstein (Feb. 4, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (appeal pending on File No. 42453-03-17 National Labor 
Court (Jerusalem), State ofIsraelPopulationand ImmigrationAuthority v. Erez Rubin-
stein) (holding that surveilling a woman just because of her "Asian appearance" is ille-
gal, and therefore may not be used as evidence in trial against her employer for illegal 
employment). 
167. Even if it were true that Barnett violated the conditions of his tourist visa by 
volunteering for a religious non-profit, the court could have inquired whether it was a 
bona fide mistake on Barnett's part, to be pardoned rather than punished. What exactly 
a tourist can do under a B/2 visa in Israel is indeed unclear, and therefore such visa 
holders are prone to mistakenly interpret it. For example, while article 5 to the Entry to 
Israel Regulation, 1974, provides that a B/2 visa is for "a short sojourn in Israel, for 
purposes other than work," when I asked the MOI - under the Freedom of Information 
Act - what type of visa should a person, who comes to do business in Israel, obtain -
the answer was a B/2 visa (letter of Ms. Davidian to author dated Aug. 10, 2015). 
168. The Custody Tribunal explicitly mentioned this, supra note 153. During the 
litigation before the Supreme Court, MOI finally agreed to let Barnet re-enter Israel, but 
asked him to sign an obligation that he would not engage in illegal proselytization. 
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tially mentioned "Messianic activity" as the reason for Barnett's visa revo-
cation, and only later introduced the "volunteering tourist" argument, be 
considered to act in good faith? I believe the evidence runs against uch a 
conclusion. 
If there is any doubt whether Barnett could survive the Mandel test, 
this doubt dissipates when we turn to the rational basis test, endorsed in 
Trump v. Hawaii. According to this test, the Court would not simply take 
the government's word for what was its reason for the visa refusal (here -
revocation), but would roll up its sleeves and delve into the nasty work of 
looking into actual evidence. If the Barnett court would have taken a mo-
ment to read the "activity report" of inspector Assaf, the protocol of the visa 
revocation hearing, the statement of visa revocation or the other documents 
described in detail above, it would have realized, I believe, that the visa 
violation was nothing more than a pretext for what was patently religious 
harassment, speech suppression and misuse of governmental power. Bar-
nett's apprehension did not promote any important or legal interest; it was 
pure silencing of an unpopular view. 
Obviously, a strict scrutiny test - the test I advocate for, following 
Justice Marshall's dissent in Mandel and Justice Sotomayor's dissent in 
Trump v. Hawaii - would have led to granting Barnett's motion. Accord-
ing to this test, the court investigates if there is a compelling governmental 
interest that would outweigh the right to freedom of speech. Here, the right 
can be claimed by several entities (Barnett, his fellow Messianic Jews, the 
Israeli public), and the governmental interest - to ensure that ourists do not 
do volunteer work during their stay - is not so compelling. If it was the real 
reason for the deportation to begin with, and, moreover, if Barnett had a 
bona fide mistake regarding his visa conditions, a matter that was not seri-
ously considered. The decision of ten-year entry ban, therefore, seems 
highly disproportionate. An interesting point to be noted is that while both 
the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court rejected Barnett's petition 
and appeal, respectively, they both related to the matter of proportionality, 
highlighting the fact that Barnett would, in reality, be able to re-enter Israel 
before the ten-year ban is over. 169 This referral might indicate that Israeli 
169. The Administrative Court signed its decision with these words: "It was made 
clear, that by the MOI's perspective, the petitioner will not face a complete ban on entry 
to Israel, but for the next ten years will have to apply in a request to the MOI, if he 
wishes to enter. This is a proportionate and reasonable decision, and the Court will not 
intervene in it." AdminC (Cr.) 11986-02-14 Barnett v. Population and Immigration 
Authority et al. 4 (Apr. 20, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
During the litigation before the Supreme Court, Barnett's request to re-enter Israel 
was granted. The Supreme Court wrote: "The fact that the ban was softened by adding 
the option for the appellant to apply for a Visa is sufficient for the determination that 
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Courts are open to the idea of strict scrutiny in cases of foreigners' exclu-
sion on ideological grounds. 
B. The Israeli-PalestinianBereaved Familiesfor Peace Case 
The Memorial Day Law for the Fallen of Israel's Wars, enacted in 
1963, provides that "[t]he fourth of Iyar will be the Memorial Day for 
soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces who made the ultimate sacrifice in 
order to assure the xistence of the State of Israel, as well as those who fell 
in the campaigns to create the State of Israel, to memorialize them and pay 
tribute to their courage." 17 0 The law further provides that on Memorial Day 
two minutes of silence will be observed throughout the entire country; flags 
will be lowered to half-mast in all public buildings; and ceremonies, com-
memorations and public gatherings will take place. 
For over a decade, an alternative memorial ceremony takes place in 
Israel, at the exact date that the Memorial Day Law stipulates as the annual 
day for commemorating the fallen. This alternative ceremony is organized 
by "The Parents Circle - Families Forum (PCFF)," a joint Israeli-Palestin-
ian non-profit organization of over 600 families, all of whom have lost an 
immediate family member to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ac-
cording to the organization's website, "the PCFF has concluded that the 
process of reconciliation between nations is a prerequisite to achieving a 
sustainable peace. The organization thus utilizes all resources available in 
education, public meetings and the media, to spread these ideas."171 
In the PCFF alternative ceremony, bereaved Israeli families it side by 
side with bereaved Palestinian families, share their grief and aspiration for 
peace. Representatives of the two peoples go on stage and read texts. The 
message is one of solidarity and recognition that due to the ongoing con-
flict, both sides suffer. As years go by, more people attend the PCFF cere-
mony, taking place in Tel Aviv. In 2017, the year before the case came to 
Court for the first time, the number of participants rose to 4000. Neverthe-
less, the event remains out of consensus in Israeli public. 
Until 2018, the Civil Administration office of the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) allowed Palestinian bereaved families from the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territories (OPT) to attend the ceremony, by issuing them a short 
the order does not prevent his entry in an absolute manner." AdminA 3919/14 Barnett 
v. Populationand ImmigrationAuthority et al. 4 (June 18, 2015), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew). 
170. Memorial Day Law for the Fallen of Israel's Wars Law, 1963-, https:// 
www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/MemorialDayLaw_eng.htm 
171. See About PCFF, THE PARENTS CIRCLE http://theparentscircle.org/en/ 
about_eng/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). 
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term permit into Israel, unless there was a security concern that allegedly 
prevented it.172 In 2018, Minister of Defense Avigdor Liberman refused for 
the first time to allow any of the Palestinians in for the purpose of attending 
the alternative ceremony. He tweeted: 
I decided to bar entry to Israel of . . . . Palestinians who were 
invited to an Israeli-Palestinian "joint ceremony" to be held on the 
evening of Memorial Day. I will not allow desecrating Memorial 
Day. It is not a memorial ceremony but rather an exhibition of bad 
taste and insensitivity, which hurts the bereaved families, who are 
17 3 most dear to us. 
In the formal refusal, which followed Liberman's tweet, the deputy 
legal advisor of the Ministry of Defense wrote to PCFF that the State holds 
broad discretion in deciding whether to allow foreigners into the country; 
and that the alternative ceremony hurts he feelings of the general public in 
Israel, specifically a significant portion of the bereaved Israeli families. Fur-
ther, the ceremony could potentially be held outside of Israel, in a manner 
that would not hurt the feelings of the general public as much. All these 
arguments were repeated by the State before the High Court of Justice, 
when PCFF and others petitioned against the Minister of Defense's deci-
sion. 17 4 The petitioners, on their part, argued that the decision to ban entry 
of Palestinians to the ceremony infringes on the freedom of expression of 
the organizers and the participants of the alternative ceremony, and their 
right to commemorate their loved ones as they see fit. They further stressed 
that the mutual ceremony intends to promote dialogue, reconciliation and 
the bringing together of Jews and Palestinians. 
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the Minister of 
Defense to issue temporary permits to 90 Palestinians - the same number 
that was approved for that cause in a previous year - to enter Israel from 
the OPT in order to attend the ceremony. 
The Court reasoned as follows: 
172. For IDF regulation on entry of Palestinian civilians into Israel see: Civil 
Administration Office of the Israeli Defense Forces, Unclassified Permission Status for 
the Entrance of Palestinians to Israel, for their Passage between Judea and Samaria and 
the Gaza Strip, and Their Exit Abroad (2019) (in Hebrew), http://www.gisha.org/User 
Files/File/LegalDocuments/procedures/general/50.pdf. 
173. HCJ 2964/18 The Parents Circle - Families Forum (PCFF)v. Minister of 
Defense (Apr. 16, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
174. Id. An additional argument, according to which some of the Palestinian invi-
tees are relatives of terrorists, who were killed while trying to execute their terrorist 
attacks, was later withdrawn by the State's legal representatives, who apologized before 
the Court for making this unfounded argument. 
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We examined the Minister of Defense's stance in this case ... 
and we conclude that the decision does not take into account the real-
ity that was created throughout the years regarding issuance of per-
mits for participation in the joint ceremony and the legitimate 
expectations that were naturally formed among the joint ceremony 
organizers following the previous policy. We also found that, when 
executing his discretion, the Minister of Defense completely disre-
garded the considerations which relate to the feelings of the bereaved 
families who wish to conduct the ceremony in the planned manner, 
by Israelis and Palestinians jointly. Also absent from the Minister of 
Defense's considerations are the feelings of the segment of Israeli 
society which supports the existence of the ceremony and identifies 
with its content and aims .... 
The Minister of Defense's stance puts the entire weight on the be-
reaved families and the public which the joint ceremony hurts its feelings, 
while completely overlooking the feelings of the bereaved families and the 
public who wish to conduct the ceremony as it was conducted throughout 
the years. Hence, the Minister's decision is unbalanced and unreasonable to 
the extent that justifies our intervention.17 5 
In a subsequent paragraph the Court wrote that the petitioners' ideol-
ogy, even if in dispute, is reconciliatory and non-defying, and stressed the 
blessing embedded in a plurality of opinions and "the importance to allow 
each person the freedom to choose his own path out of a recognition that 
this is a vital and central element, which a democratic society in based 
on." 176 
The decision was handed down on the morning of April 17, 2018. At 
that very evening the ceremony took place, after the Palestinian participants 
were allowed in. According to media coverage, around 7000 people at-
tended the ceremony, and several hundred protested against it nearby. 
In this case, unlike in Barnett, the Palestinian petitioners17 7 have yet to 
enter Israeli territory. Hence, they themselves could not have invoked a 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. I am analyzing this case by legal norms applied by Israeli courts. Hence, I 
overlook the political difficulty (some would say irony) of describing Palestinians as 
"outsiders" who need a permit to enter a territory once part of the land they or their 
ancestors used to inhabit. The Supreme Court of Israel did recently rule that Palestini-
ans who had a permanent residence status (i.e. residents of East Jerusalem) should not 
be easily stripped of that status, as they are not mere immigrants, by rather natives, who 
were born in the area, and whose families inhabited the land for generations (HCJ 7803/ 
06 Abu Arfa v. Minister of Interior(13.9.2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, 
in Hebrew). However, this does not grant a right for a Palestinian from the OPT, who 
was never granted residency status in Israel, to enter the country. Under international 
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right to freedom of speech in Israel. However, the Israeli bereaved families 
and the Israeli public wishing to attend the ceremony do have a right to 
pursue a dialogue with them. Indeed, the mere standing of the bereaved 
Israeli families side by side with the bereaved Palestinian families, holding 
hands, mourning together, is highly expressive and political - even before 
a word is uttered. The mere standing together, in Israel, during Memorial 
Day, is an expressive conduct, a message. As the American Supreme Court 
ruled, in deciding whether a particular conduct possesses sufficient commu-
nicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, the court should 
ask itself whether "an intent to convey a particularized message was pre-
sent, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be un-
derstood by those who viewed it."1 7 8 In the Bereaved Families case the 
answers for both these questions is in the affirmative. Hence, the mere gath-
ering of the families from both sides of the border deserves freedom of 
expression protection. Obviously, the verbal messages conveyed in previ-
ous ceremonies, and expected to be conveyed in the 2018 one as well -
messages of co-existence and peace between Israelis and Palestinians - are 
also entitled to constitutional protection as political speech. 
To justifiably curtail the Israeli citizens' freedom of speech, the Israeli 
authorities must have proven a compelling governmental interest that would 
outweigh it. The Minister's awkward "bad taste" argument is not even a 
legitimate interest, let alone "compelling" one. The argument regarding the 
fact that some, maybe most, Israeli bereaved families will be hurt and of-
fended by the Israel-Palestinian gathering is also not a compelling interest, 
since - as the Court correctly observed - it prefers protecting the feelings 
of some bereaved families over the feelings and ideology of others. Moreo-
ver, according to Supreme Court precedents, only in the most extreme and 
exceptional cases could negative feelings such as insult, sadness or fury, 
however sincere, be considered a compelling interest, which overrides the 
right to freedom of speech. 179 Hence, from a legal point of view, this was an 
easy case, which the Court ruled correctly. 
It should be noted, however, that while the Court indeed reached in 
this 2018 decision the correct outcome, it is doubtful if the case was de-
cided on free speech grounds. The Court did mention, towards the end of its 
law of occupation, there is no right of the residents of the occupied territory to enter the 
territory of the occupier. 
178. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 404 (1989). The case was cited by the Israeli 
District Court in CrimA 5035/09 Nawi v. State of Israel (14.4.2010), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
179. See, e.g., HCJ 316/03 Mohammed Bakri et al v. Film Review Commission et 
al, 58(1) PD 249, 283 (2003) 
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decision, the importance of plurality of ideas in a democratic regime. How-
ever, most of its reasoning revolved around the fact that the Minister of 
Defense did not give any weight to the feelings of the bereaved families 
who were part of the Israeli-Palestinian forum, hence giving disproportion-
ate (as a matter of fact, absolute) weight to that of the other families. As 
such, it is "merely" a ruling of unreasonableness under administrative law. 
Violation of the petitioners' reliance interest, another ground in administra-
tive rather than constitutional law, was also mentioned by the Court. 
This might very well be the reason that in the following year the Min-
ister of Defense (this time not Liberman, but rather Prime Minister himself, 
who acted as Minister of Defense simultaneously) decided againto ban the 
entry of the Palestinian bereaved families to the 2019 ceremony. The appli-
cation for their entry was this time refused in a succinct sentence: "Hello. 
The application is denied since there is a closure on Memorial Day eve." A 
petition was again submitted to the High Court of Justice, which this time 
used a clear freedom of expression terminology and reasoning to accept the 
petition and order the Minister to issue entry permits to the Palestinian fam-
ilies. The Court rejected the Minister's argument that the decision was 
based on security reasons. Judge Amit wrote in his leading opinion: "There 
are ninety-nine ways for memorialization. There are ninety-nine ways to 
express grief. Here lies the core of freedom of expression, of personal au-
tonomy, the one that grants each person the opportunity to wrote and to 
design his own life story as he sees fit 180" Judge Barak-Erez added: 
This petition is not only about Israel's admission regime and the 
rules which apply to judicial review thereof, but rather about a ques-
tion which bears clear aspects of protecting freedom of speech, on 
which strict standards apply. As far as the ceremony's organizers are 
concerned, the identity of the ceremony's participants is part of the 
message which they wish to convey. The decision which was made 
[by the Minister of Defense] has ramification on the conveyance of 
the message in an area which is at the core of freedom of speech 
protection - matters of disagreement in the public sphere. Hence, the 
respondents had to take this matter into account, but their response 
mentioned nothing of it. As judges, our role is to ensure that freedom 
of speech in the Israeli society, particularly in matters of dispute, is 
well kept. 
To conclude, the 2019 decision, unlike the 2018 one, used unequivocal 
constitutional reasoning, which is called for in freedom of expression cases. 
180. HCJ 3052/19 Fighting for Pease Ltd. And The Parents Circle - Families 
Forum (PCFF)v. Ministerof Defense 7 (May 6, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by sub-
scription, in Hebrew). 
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Specifically, Justice Barak Erez, in her concurring opinion, echoed the rul-
ing of the U.S. District Court in the American Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee case,181 and made clear, that even when the Israeli Government 
(there - the American Congress) exercises its power at the core of immigra-
tion regime (in the Israeli case - the power of non-admission; in the Ameri-
can case - the power of deportation), it must use it within constitutional 
boundaries, including the limit on freedom of speech violation.18 2 Accord-
ingly, the 2019 decision applied strict scrutiny and rigorous judicial review. 
After this second decision, it would be much harder for the Government to 
ignore the Court's precedent, and one could anticipate (and hope) that it 
would not attempt to hinder future alternative Memorial Day ceremonies as 
it attempted to in 2018 and 2019. 
C. The Anti-BDS Legislation 
For a decade at least, the Israeli Knesset and Government have sought 
ways to suppress the support of boycott against Israel, manifestations of 
which became more common around the world.183 The first measure taken 
was the enactment of the Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of 
Israel through Boycott of 2011, also known as the Boycott Law.184 The 
Boycott Law defines "a boycott against the State of Israel" as "deliberately 
avoiding economic, cultural or academic ties with another person or body 
solely because of their affinity with the State of Israel, one of its institutions 
or an area under its control, in such a way that may cause economic, cul-
tural or academic damage." 185 It further considers that knowingly publish-
ing an item which carries a reasonable probability that it will lead to a 
boycott, is a civil wrong. 186 Article 3 of the Law also limits the participation 
in tenders of any person or organization who published a call for a boycott 
181. Supra note 64. 
182. See Bosniak, supra note 104 at 73. 
183. The leading entity for the advancement of international boycott against Israel 
is the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement. BDS MOVEMENT, https:// 
bdsmovement.net (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). While Israel's struggle against boycott 
initiatives is not confined to the BDS movement alone, the BDS movement has become 
the main target of criticism and anti-boycott struggle by Israeli politicians and media. 
Hence, I title the legislation discussed below "the anti-BDS Legislation." 
184. Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott, 5771-
2011, SH No. 2304 p. 972. 
185. Id. at § 1. 
186. Id. at § 2. 
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or is committed to take part in one, 187 while Article 4 withholds financial 
benefits from any person or organization that does so.188 
Petitions to the Supreme Court against the Boycott Law were submit-
ted, and litigated before an extended nine-judge panel, which was split on 
different issues relating to the law. The Court unanimously held that the 
purpose of the Boycott Law, to protect the citizens of Israel from economic, 
cultural or academic damages, is a legitimate purpose (i.e., that the struggle 
against boycott is a legitimate and compelling governmental interest). It 
further unanimously held that Section 2(c) of the Law, which originally 
allowed for the imposition of punitive damages, without the need to prove 
causation between the wrongful act (i.e. call for boycott) and actual dam-
age, was a disproportionate and therefore an unconstitutional infringement 
of the right of freedom of speech and declared it void. 189 Judge Melcer, 
writing the principal majority opinion, held that "the unbridled 'punitive 
damages' regime created by Section 2(c) of the Law exceeded the confines 
of the 'proportionality zone,'" as the punitive damages carry "a 'chilling 
effect' on political expressions and lively social discourse." 190 It was also 
unanimously decided to deny the petitions in so far as they related to Sec-
tions 3 and 4 of the Law, due to lack of ripeness for adjudication, and 
allowed for future petition against them, if and when the Minister of Fi-
nance would take action under these Sections. 
The majority opinion, supported by five Judges, denied the petitions 
relating to Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Law, which define the tortious 
wrongdoing, against the dissenting opinions, delivered by four judges. 
While all Judges agreed that the Boycott Law infringes freedom of speech, 
they diverged as to whether a call to boycott lies at the core of protected 
political speech, or somewhere closer to its margins, 191 and consequently 
187. Id. at § 3. 
188. Id. at § 4. 
189. HCJ 5239/11 Uri Avnery et al v. The Knesset et al (Apr. 15, 2015), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). All citations are taken from the English 
summary of the Avnery judgement, available at https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/ 
Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\1 1\390\052\k21 &fileName=11052390. 
K21&type=4 [Hereinafter: Avnery English Summary of Judgment]. 
190. Avnery English Summary of Judgment, supra note 189, at 6. 
191. According to Judge Melcer's opinion, although a call to a political boycott is 
a political speech, which usually enjoys the highest level of protection by the courts, it 
also deviates from the "pure" freedom of speech. Avnery, para. 30 (Judge Melcer). He 
also rejected the petitioners' claims that a call to boycott helps promote the marketplace 
of ideas, as it wishes to change the political status quo by coercion achieved by eco-
nomic means, and not by adhering to reason, and as such, a democratic state aimed at 
promoting the marketplace of ideas will be more reluctant to protect boycotters' free-
dom of speech. Id. Deputy President Rubinstein concurred with Judge Melcer. Id. at 
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also on the constitutionality of transforming such a call into a civil wrong 
under the Boycott Law. 
Some of the Judges recognized that at the heart of the petition was a 
hotly debated political controversy, which is the Israeli policy towards the 
West Bank, East Jerusalem and other territories in dispute, insinuated in the 
Boycott Law by the words "an area under its [Israel's] control." As judge 
Danziger noted, "the fate of the Area and the settlements located in it is a 
matter of profound political and public disagreement in Israel" 192 and as 
such, "those wishing to express their discontent with the government's pol-
icy regarding the Area and to call others to oppose that policy, are entitled 
to the full protection granted in our constitutional regime for political ex-
pression." 193 Hence, as a boycott of this kind addresses an internal Israeli 
political issue, it cannot be regarded as an expression of protest against the 
existence of the State of Israel per se. Other judges, including from the 
majority camp, agreed with the insight that the Boycott Law, by referring 
not only to boycotting a person or an entity qua Israeli but also for her or its 
ties to "an area" under Israel's control (i.e. settlements) touches upon the 
exposed nerves of Israeli politics. 194 
para. D (Deputy President Rubinstein). Judge Amit also joined Judge Melcer by holding 
that calling to a boycott fails to promote other rationales of freedom of speech, which 
are the driving out of falsity and the discovery of truth and the enhancement of the 
democratic process. Id. at Para. 12, 21 (Judge Amit). Retired President Grunis and act-
ing President Naor also concurred with Judge Melcer. Id. at para. 2 (Retired President 
Grunis), para. 3 (President Naor). Unlike the majority opinions, Judge Danziger, whom 
Judge Joubran joined, held that a call to a political boycott promotes the three underly-
ing rationales of freedom of speech: promotion of the marketplace of ideas, the en-
hancement of the political discourse, and the expression of autonomy by the boycotter. 
Id. at para. 26 (Judge Danziger), para. 1 (Judge Joubran). Judge Vogelman also held 
that a call to boycott the Israeli settlements in the OPT is a clear political expression. Id. 
at para 2 (Judge Vogelman). 
192. Avnery English Summary of Judgement, supra note 189, at 7. 
193. Id. 
194. Judge Hendel stressed that the Law, in itself, will lead courts into meddling 
with clear political policy. Avnery, para 9 (Judge Hendel). Deputy President Rubinstein, 
while recognizing that the expertise of the courts in matters of political policy is limited, 
also states that the State of Israel is facing boycotts caused by the BDS movement and 
that the Law sets to address this issue - and aims at protecting the interests of Israeli 
citizens who settled in the Area, backed by the support of the Israeli governments 
throughout the years. Id. at para. YA (Deputy President Rubinstein). Retired President 
Grunis also expressed concerns regarding the involvement of judges in political issues 
such as the Israeli control over the Area, and emphasized that the legislator may defend 
Israeli citizens' property and well-being by suppressing calls to boycotts. Id. at para. 4 
(Retired President Grunis). 
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This led Judge Danziger to interpret, alongside Judge Joubran, Section 
1 of the Boycott Law, which sets the definition for the application of the 
Law, to read that only a certain type of boycott crosses the threshold of the 
Law - a complete boycott against the State of Israel as such. Hence, ruled 
the two minority Judges, "a call to boycott an institution of the State or a 
call to boycott areas which are under the control of the State, unless accom-
panied by a call for an overall boycott of the State, shall not come within 
the ambit of the Law." 195 Judge Vogelman, dissenting separately, used the 
"blue pencil" technique to simply delete the words "or area under its con-
trol" from the Boycott Law.196 Judge Hendel, in his own dissenting opinion, 
held that Section 2 should be annulled altogether. According to Judge 
Hendel, the Section ". . . does not pass the constitutionality test and 'priva-
tization' of the opportunity to protect the public interest by putting it in the 
hands of the individual could create a significant chilling effect against po-
litical freedom of expression." 197 
The majority judges, however, were satisfied with striking down the 
punitive damages provision of the Boycott Law, and refused to declare the 
labeling of a call for boycott as a civil wrong, in and of itself, unconstitu-
tional. Yet, it should be added, so far no civil suit was filed against anyone 
in Israel for perpetrating a tortious wrong under the Boycott Law. Striking 
down the provision, which originally enabled to sue a person for boycott 
support without the need to prove a nexus between such support and the 
suffering of actual damages, has no doubt maid such legal proceedings al-
most impossible to win. 
Apart from stipulating that boycott calls constitute a civil wrong, the 
Israeli Government, in 2015, decided that the Ministry of Strategic Affairs 
would be in charge of fighting the delegitimization of Israel in general and 
the BDS movement in particular. 198 In August 2016, a joint team, headed by 
the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Strategic Affairs, examined the 
issue of refusing the admission of activists in the BDS movement into 
Israel. 199 In March 2017, the Knesset passed Amendment 28 to the Entry 
into Israel Law, which amended Article 2 of the law. 200 Following Amend-
ment 28, Article 2(d) bars the issuance of a visa or a residency permit for 
195. Avnery English Summary of Judgement, supra note 189, at 9. 
196. Avnery, at para 9 (Judge Vogelman). 
197. Avnery English Summary of Judgement, supra note 189, at 10. 
198. Decision 511 of the 34th Government of Israel "Transferring of area of activ-
ity from the Prime Minister's Office to the Office of Strategic Affairs" (2.9.2015), 
https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2015_dec511. 
199. Criteria for the Prevention of Entry to Israel of BDS Activists, https://www. 
gov.il/he/Departments/Policies/bdsactivits_criteria_for_entering_israel. 
200. Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, SH No. 111, p. 354. 
132 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
any foreigner who made a "public call for boycotting Israel," as defined in 
the Boycott Law, or is affiliated with an organization that did so. 20 1 It is 
important to note, that unlike in the Boycott Law, Amendment 28 does not 
set a probability of harm criterion. Article 2(e) provides that the Minister of 
Interior may issue a visa or a residency permit to a boycott supporter none-
theless "for special reasons", hence creating an interplay reminiscent of 
Sections 1182(a)(27) and Section 1182(a)(28) of the aforementioned and 
erstwhile, McCarran-Walter Act. 20 2 
Shortly thereafter, the Population and Immigration Authority pub-
lished a list of criteria for the application of the Amendment. 20 3 It states that 
an organization which supports boycotts and promotes them in an active 
and ongoing manner, rather than merely criticize Israeli policy, would be 
regarded an organization which is publicly calling for the boycotting of 
Israel, within the meaning of Amendment 28. The list also states how to 
identify activists that affiliate with such organizations: serving as senior 
executives in the organization; central activists (i.e. those who actively, sub-
stantially, and consistently promote boycotts, either within the organization 
or independently); etc. Institutional actors, such as mayors, 204 who actively 
and consistently promote boycotts are also on the list of criteria. 
Since the enactment of the Amendment, several scholars and human 
rights activists were denied entry into Israel. 205 It should be noted, however, 
201. Id. at § 2(d). 
202. Id. at § 2(e). 
203. Criteria for the Prevention of Entry to Israel of BDS Activists, supra note 
199. 
204. See, e.g., Yanir Cozin, Despite Ban, Pro-BDS Dublin Mayor Enters Israel 
after Name Gaffe, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Is-
raeli-Conflict/Senior-BDS-activist-entered-Israel-after-Ministry-misspelled-name-
549451;Leyal Khalife, FrenchMayor DeniedEntry by IsraeliAuthoritiesBecause He's 
a BDS Supporter, STEPFEED (Apr. 20, 2018), https://stepfeed.com/french-mayor-de-
nied-entry-by-israeli-authorities-because-he-s-a-bds-supporter-8856. Palestinian BDS 
National Committee (BNC), Dozens of Spanish cities declaring themselves 'Free of 
IsraeliApartheid', BDSMOVEMENT (Sept. 8, 2016), https://bdsmovement.net/news/doz-
ens-spanish-cities-declaring-themselves-free-israeli-apartheid. 
205. In July 2017, only 4 months after the legislation, 5 BDS activists were pre-
vented from boarding their flight from Washington, D.C. to Israel. Upon boarding the 
plane, the group was told that the Israeli government had ordered the airline not to let 
them aboard. See: 5 BDS Activists Preventedfrom Boarding Flight to Israel, TIMES 
ISRAEL (July 25, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/bds-activists-prevented-from-
boarding-flight-to-israel/. In May 2018, Katherine Franke and Vincent Warren, two 
U.S. human rights activists (Franke being also a professor at Columbia Law School), 
were detained for 14 hours upon arrival to Ben-Gurion Airport and were flown back to 
New York afterwards. Israel accused the two, which were invited to lead a delegation of 
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that although it seems that Amendment 28 caused an inflation of ideological 
exclusions and deportations, similar actions were carried out prior to its 
enactment as well. 20 6 In these previous instances, the Minister of Interior 
simply invoked his general authority - embedded in Article 11 to the En-
15 fellow human rights activists touring Israel and the West Bank, of being involved in 
the BDS movement. See: Dina Kraft, Two Leading U.S. Human Rights Activists Re-
fused Entry to Israel, One for BDS Ties, HAARETZ (May 3, 2018), https:// 
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-two-leading-u-s-human-rights-activists-de-
ported-from-israel-1.6052515. In the beginning of July 2018, Ariel Gold, a Jewish pro-
Palestinian activist and an affiliate of the NGO Code Pink, was barred from entering 
Israel. Gold, who came on a visa to take part in a Jewish studies program at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, was deported after the Minister of Strategic Affairs requested 
the Minister of Interior to have her visa canceled. See: ProminentJewish BDS Activist 
Denied Entry to Israel, TIMES ISRAEL (July 2, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/ 
prominent-jewish-bds-activist-denied-entry-to-israel/. A month later, Jewish-American 
journalist Peter Beinart was withheld at the airport, where he was questioned about his 
association with various Israeli NGOs and about his past participation in a demonstra-
tion in Hebron in support of Palestinians rights. See: Amir Tibon & Noa Landau, 
Israel'sShin Bet Detains Peter Beinartat Ben-Gurion Airport Over PoliticalActivity, 
HAHRETZ (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-beinart-i-
was-detained-at-ben-gurion-airport-over-political-activity-1.6381149. Unlike the previ-
ous describe incidents, however, Beinart was finally allowed in. Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu later esponded that the Beinart withholding and questioning was "an admin-
istrative mistake". See: Amir Tibon & Noa Landau, Israel's Shin Bet Detains Peter 
Beinart at Ben-Gurion Airport Over Political Activity, HAHRETZ (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-beinart-i-was-detained-at-ben-gurion-
airport-over-political-activity-1.6381149. There might, of course, be other similar in-
stances, unknown for lack of media coverage The Association for Civil Rights in Israel 
(ACRI) issued a letter to the Ministry of Justice, claiming that the airport detentions 
made by the Shin Bet are intimidating and having a chilling effect on the right to free-
dom of speech. Deputy Attorney General Dina Zilber responded by saying that the 
detentions are within the Shin Bet authority, but that the protocols for the execution of 
this authority will undergo "refresh," as "some Shin Bet and border officials behaved in 
ways that did not conform to the legal and policy restrictions." Shin Bet Will no Longer 
Ask Would-Be Entrants to Israel about Their Politics, TIMES ISRAEL (Setp. 28, 2018), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-wont-ask-about-political-views-at-the-border-
top-official-says/. For the full correspondence between ACRI and the DOJ, see Deten-
tion of Activists in Airports, ACRI (Jul. 31, 2018), https://law.acri.org.il/he/42741. 
206. This was acknowledged by the State in its answer to the petitions mentioned 
above: Para 28 to State's answer to petition made in HCJ 3965/17 Alon Harel(Prof) et 
al. v. The Knesset et al. (Feb. 2, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew). 
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try into Israel Law - to revoke any visa or permit previously issued under 
the Law.207 
Amendment 28 has already generated several legal proceedings re-
garding its constitutionality or the legality of its application. Two months 
after its enactment, a petition challenging its constitutionality was filed 
before the Supreme Court.2 0 The petitioners, two professors from the He-
brew University of Jerusalem, claimed that the Amendment has an adverse 
effect on them as members of the Israeli academia, for their lack of ability 
to organize conferences and round tables without any certainty if the invited 
foreign speakers may enter Israel. As such, the Amendment violates their 
freedom of occupation, as well as their freedom of speech and that of other 
Israeli citizens, wishing to be exposed to criticism on Israel's policy. 
The Supreme Court held one and only oral hearing of the petition. 
Judge Vogeleman stressed, alongside Judges Melcer and Barak-Erez, that 
given the ruling in Mandel, it is problematic for the petitioners, who re-
ferred to the case, to rely on it. 209 The judges advised the petitioners to 
withdraw their petition, whilst not barring the petitioners from re-submit-
ting a revised petition. The petition was withdrawn, and then re-submit-
ted.210 However, the second petition was also dismissed following an oral 
207. For example, in 2008, Jewish American academic Norman Finkelstein was 
deported from Israel and banned from re-entry for 10 years, due to expression of soli-
darity with Hizbullah, a Lebanese Islamic militia: Toni O'Loughlin, US Academic De-
ported and Bannedfor Criticising Israel, GUARDIAN (May 26, 2008), https://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2008/may/26/israelandthepalestinians.usa. Two years later, the re-
nowned scholar Professor Noam Chomsky was denied entry into Israel and the West 
Bank, after being invited to speak at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank. Chomsky 
claimed that the Ministry of Interior .... apparently didn't like the fact that I was due 
to lecture at a Palestinian university and not in Israel." (Amira Hass, Noam Chomsky 
Denied Entry into Israel and West Bank, HAARETZ (May 16, 2010), https:// 
www.haaretz.com/1.5121279.) In 2016, Israel refused to issue a visa for Isabel Phiri, an 
assistant general secretary with the World Council of Churches in Geneva, for her al-
leged activism in the BDS movement. File No. 3084-18 Court of Appeals of The Entry 
into Israel Law, 1952, Phiri v. Population and ImmigrationAuthority (Oct. 17, 2018), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that a border service of-
ficer's decision to deny entry to Phiri, before the enactment of Amendment 28, due to 
concern that Phiri will illegally emigrate to Israel, was unreasonable and that the Popu-
lation and Immigration Authority must provide explanations for its decision to exclude 
Phiri from Israel). 
208. HCJ 3965/17 Alon Harel (Prof.) et al. v. The Knesset et al. (Feb. 2, 2018), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
209. P. 3-4 to protocol of discussion held at Feb. 2, 2018 in HCJ 3965/17 Alon 
Harel (in Hebrew) (on file with author). 
210. HCJ 5029/18 Alon Harel (Prof.) et al. v. The Knesset et al. 
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hearing, in which the judges were again unfavorable to the petition. No 
written reasoning was offered by the Court. 
The Amendment was also litigated in concrete individual cases, in 
which the interpretation and application of it (rather than its constitutional-
ity) were discussed.21 The most important of which is that of Lara Al-
211. One of them is the case of Omar Shakir. On May 2018, the Minister of 
Interior refused to renew a one year B/1 working permit, previously given to Shakir, an 
American citizen working in Israel since 2017 on behalf of Humans Rights Watch 
(HRW). The decision followed extensive research done by the Ministry of Strategic 
Affairs regarding different statements made by Shakir, from the time he was a student 
in the United States (and was the co-President of "Students for Palestinian Human 
Rights," a Stanford student body that called for economic boycott of Israel) and up until 
the time he was working in Israel (during which he tried to attend a FIFA meeting in 
Bahrain, in order to put pressure, as he admitted in a tweet, to boycott Israeli soccer 
clubs operating from Israeli settlements in the OPT). (For the report of the Ministry of 
Strategic Affairs dated 12 July 2017, in Hebrew, see: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/supporting-resources/ministry-strategic_affairsdossier_hebrew.pdf). In March 
2018 the Ministry of Strategic Affairs issued an updated report on Shakir, repeating 
most of the findings of the previous report with one major difference: it now acknowl-
edged that since his arrival to Israel, Shakir made no public call to boycott Israel, albeit 
"he continues to encourage activity in this area [boycott on Israel] indirectly through 
expression in his Twitter account" (Section 4 to a report by the Ministry of Strategic 
Affairs and Public Diplomacy, dated 28 March 2018; annex B to the State's response of 
21 June 2018 (copy with author)). Despite this difference, the recommendation of the 
Ministry of Strategic affairs, not to renew Shakir's visa, remained, as did the decision of 
the Minister of Interior. HRW and Shakir petitioned against the Minister of Interior to 
the Administrative Court of Jerusalem (File No. 36759-05-18 AdminA (Jer), Human 
Rights Watch v. Minister of Interior (Apr. 16, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by sub-
scription, in Hebrew). They argued, among other things that deporting an alien, or not 
allowing her in, because of her support of boycott is a disproportionate infringement on 
freedom of speech, and hence unconstitutional. The petition was denied. The Adminis-
trative Court ruled that Shakir, who refused to declare before the Court that he would 
not call for a boycott against Israel while he is in the Country (unlike Alqasm, who 
agreed to do so) failed to convince the Court that he neglected his past support of 
boycotting Israel. An appeal to the Supreme Court was denied (Admin. App. 2966/19 
Human Rights Watch v. Minister of Interior(Nov. 5, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew). The Supreme Court agreed with the lower Court's reasoning 
and refused to discuss the constitutionality of Amendment 28 for procedural reasons. 
The Court rejected Shakir's argument, that a call for boycott supported by a claim that 
Israeli activities in the occupies territories are violations on international law, is outside 
the ambit of Amendment 28. It further held, that Shakir lacked standing to raise an 
argument regarding the infringement of freedom of speech of Israelis resulting from his 
deportation. A request for rehearing in an extended panel was denied (F.H.Admin. 
7697/19 Human Rights Watch v. Minister of Interior (Jan. 20, 2020), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
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qasem. The Israeli consulate in Miami issued Alqasem, a 22-year-old 
American citizen, a one-year student visa, after she was admitted to a 
Master's program in Human Rights and Transitional Justice at the Faculty 
of Law of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. However, upon arrival to 
Ben Gurion airport, Alqasem was denied entry, based on Amendment 28, as 
the Ministry of Strategic Affairs found evidence that she was a member, 
and later on the president of "Students for Justice in Palestine" (SJP) while 
she was a college student in the University of Florida. The small union, 
consisting of less than ten students, was affiliated - so claimed the Minis-
try - with National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), which is on 
the Ministry's "blacklist" as a supporter of boycotting Israel. 
Alqasem appealed to the Appellate Immigration Tribunal 212 and ar-
gued that she was unaffiliated with SJP for over a year, and does not sup-
port boycotting of Israel any longer, hence willing to study in an Israeli 
university. She declared before the Tribunal that she would not engage in 
any boycott activities while in Israel. Her lawyers presented a letter from 
the Rector of the Hebrew University, supporting her appeal. In that letter, 
the University mainly introduced utilitarian concerns, such as that the entry 
ban would adversely affect the great effort of Israeli academia, with the 
support and funding of the Israeli government, to build international ties 
with other universities worldwide; and that the entry ban would serve as 
double-edge sword, as it would only fuel BDS rhetoric against Israel in-
stead of portraying Israel as a "democratic, enlightened and egalitarian 
state." Despite all of this, the appeal was dismissed, based on the Tribunal's 
ruling that the Executive's decision was within the bounds of 
reasonableness. 
Alqasem then appealed to the Tel Aviv Administrative Court. At that 
point, the Hebrew University requested, and was granted permission, to join 
the appeal. In its short submission, the University basically made the same 
arguments as its Rector did in his aforementioned letter. The Administrative 
Court rejected the appeal. It mentioned the notion of SEP and added that 
"there is a significant concern that the appellant would use her stay in Israel 
to promote pleas for boycotting Israel." 213 Regarding the Hebrew Univer-
sity's stand, the Court ruled that despite the importance to encourage stu-
dent exchange programs and academic collaborations between Israeli 
universities and their counterparts abroad, endeavors that might indeed be 
212. File No. 5604-18 Court of Appeals of The Entry into Israel Law (TA) Al-
qasem v. Ministry of Interior (Oct. 4, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew). 
213. File No. 11002-10-18 AdminA (TA) Alqasem v. Ministry of Interior(Oct. 12, 
2018), at para. 15 Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). 
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jeopardized by the decision to ban Alqasem's entry after she already ob-
tained a student visa, the Executive's decision is within bounds of 
reasonableness. 
A three judge panel of Supreme Court overturned the Administrative 
Court's decision, and allowed Alqasem into the country. At this point, for 
the first time, the Hebrew University introduced an argument which ex-
pressed the importance of the exchange of ideas with students such as Al-
qasem. It wrote in its submission: 
Respondent 2, as an institution of higher education of the front 
line, wishes to stress, that the university is a place of an exchange of 
ideas, earning and creating knowledge. It is a place which is not 
afraid of disagreements and celebrates plurality of voices. The Uni-
versity believes that academia grows and develops out of free ex-
change of ideas, listening, discourse and dialogue.214 
Judge Hendel, who wrote the leading opinion and was joined by Judge 
Vogelman, stressed that Alqasem's lawyers never questioned the constitu-
tionality of Amendment 28, a matter pending at the time before the Su-
preme Court. Hence, the decision dealt with the interpretation of 
Amendment 28 and its application on Alqasem, rather than its validity. He 
ruled, while relying on the concept of "defensive democracy" and quoting 
MKs deliberation during the Knesset legislation proceedings, that the 
Amendment's purpose is preventive rather than punitive. Hence, since Al-
qasem was not engaged in BDS activities for at least a year and a half, 
vowed not to advocate it while in Israel and is interested in joining an Is-
raeli university (which is the opposite of boycotting Israeli academia) -
the decision not to allow her in was not within the scope of Article 28, and 
was, furthermore, unreasonable. 215 He added that the decision is also incon-
gruent with the MOI's own internal regulations, which provide that Amend-
ment 28 would be invoked only against foreigners who advocate boycott 
against Israel in an "active, consistent and ongoing manner." While indicat-
ing in passing that one of the University's argument against the Executive's 
214. Respondent No. 2 Response in AdminA 7216/18 Alqasem v. Immigration 
and PopulationAuthority, para. 11 (Oct. 16, 2018), (on file with author; author's trans-
lation) [hereinafter University Argument]. 
215. AdminA 7216/18 Alqasem v. Immigration and Population Authority, 15 
(Oct. 18, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). It seems that the 
Court could not suffice itself by saying that the decision was given outside the scope of 
Amendment 28 and therefore without authority (ultra vires), as the State argued before 
the court that the Minister of Interior holds a broad general authority to refuse entry of 
non-Israelis, which Amendment 28 did not narrow down. Hence, the Court added that 
the decision was not only absent Amendment 28 authority, but also unreasonable. 
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decision was that "academically, there is much utility in diversity and mul-
titude of ideas generated by inclusion of students of different cultural, lin-
guistic and national background to the classrooms," 2 16 Judge Hendel did not 
base his decision on free speech grounds. As a matter of fact he stressed, 
that "invalidating the [Minister of Interior's] current decision does not im-
ply giving [Algasem] a carte blanche - since, if she goes astray again and 
usurps her stay in Israel to promote boycott activity, the Minister would be 
able to revoke her license [to stay] at once and deport her from the 
country." 217 
Judge Baron agreed, in her concurring opinion, with the interpretive 
move of Judge Hendel, which excludes past BDS supporters, who repudi-
ated from it, from the scope of Amendment 28. She is the only panel mem-
ber, however, who also mentioned free speech concerns. She wrote: 
Freedom of speech is the livelihood of democracy. When a per-
son's right to free speech is violated, due to Article 2(d) of the law, 
even if it is someone who is not an Israeli citizen or resident, an 
arrow also hits the heart of Israeli society as a democratic society. 
Freedom of speech is a condition for live and free marketplace of 
ideas and opinions, for public debate on significant matters and for 
the elucidation of stands and ideologies. In the context of the boycott 
phenomenon, freedom of speech violation inhibits the possibility to 
deal with ideas which we as a society wish to refute - and this, of 
course, is not what we wish for.218 
She then goes on to say: 
As [Algasem's] acts are not sufficient grounds for efusing her 
entry to Israel, the unavoidable impression is that revoking her visa is 
due to the politicalopinions she holds. If this is indeed the case, this 
is an extreme and dangerous step, which might lead to the dissolution 
of the pillars on which Israel's democracy stands. 219 
Following the Supreme Court ruling, Alqasem was released from her 
several weeks long immigration detention and was able to join her fellow 
students at the faculty of law of the Hebrew University. 
216. This argument concerning diversity among students is mentioned neither in 
the University's written submission to the Court, nor in the transcript of the oral hearing 
before the Court. It could have either been raised orally by the University's lawyer yet 
not transcribed, or is Judge's Hendel's own expansion of the University's written argu-
ment cited above. University submission, supra note 214. 
217. Id. at para. 18. 
218. Alqasem, at 17 (author's translation). 
219. Id. at 18-19. (author's translation; emphasis in origin). 
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The Hebrew University's joining of the proceedings, I would argue, 
had a great potential to take the Alqasem case to the constitutional sphere 
where it belongs. Unfortunately, the University decided - maybe strategi-
cally - to emphasize utilitarian concerns such as keeping the prestige of 
Israeli academia nd avoiding a scenario in which the denial of entry "back-
fires" and fuels anti-Israel activism. As observed above, only in its submis-
sion to the Supreme Court did the University, for the first time, argue that 
the denial of Alqasem's entry would be detrimental to the vigilant academic 
and political debate within Israel campuses. 220 Accordingly, the majority 
opinion of Judges Hendel and Vogelman hardly mentioned freedom of 
speech concerns. Like in the 2018 Bereaved Families case, they focused 
instead on interpretation based on the legislature's original intent, and ad-
ministrative law concerns such as the agency's abidance by its own internal 
regulations. 
Even Judge Baron, despite her attention to freedom of speech con-
cerns, did not apply strict scrutiny while reviewing the decision to disallow 
Alqasem into the country. Just like her colleagues, she based her decision 
on grounds of unreasonableness of violation of internal regulations. She 
too, like her colleagues, clarified that Alqasem is not to break her promise 
not to advocate boycott while in Israel lest she would be justifiably 
deported. 
As a result, while the Alqasem precedent is a positive development, in 
that it limits the government's power to invoke Amendment 28 to "preven-
tive" purposes only, it does not provide the fullest possible protection to 
freedom of speech, as it could and should have. I will therefore offer an 
alternative interpretation of Article 28, which is in line with the Avnery 
22 1 yetcase, more protective of freedom of speech. 
220. Compare this seemingly hesitance to raise freedom of speech concerns by the 
Hebrew University with arguments raised by universities in Mandel, supra note 44 at 
760 ("plaintiffs claim that the statutes prevent them from hearing and meeting with 
Mandel in person for discussions, in contravention of the First Amendment.") 
221. I disagree with the Avnery ruling, and support the minority opinion of Judge 
Hendel, according to which article 2 of the Boycott Law - which stipulates that a boy-
cott against Israel constitutes a civil wrong - is an unconstitutional infringement on 
freedom of speech. Interestingly enough, two American District Courts ruled in this 
vein when they considered (in preliminary proceedings) Kansas and Arizona statutes, 
which required all persons who enter into a contract with these respective states to 
certify that they are not engaged in a boycott of Israel (Koonts v. Watson, 283 F. Supp. 
3d. 1007 (2018); Jordahlv. Brnovich, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (2018)). Despite my sup-
port of the minority opinion in Avnery, I take the majority opinion as a baseline for my 
interpretive thesis of Amendment 28. I do so for doctrinal-pragmatic reasons, as the 
chances that his expanded panel's ruling will be overturned or mitigated seem ex-
tremely low. This was evident in the Supreme Court decision in Alqasem, in which even 
140 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
The Avnery case, no doubt, complicates any constitutional challenge of 
Amendment 28. As described above, the Court ruled there, that the Boycott 
Law's principal provision, which makes a calling for a boycott, of a person 
or entity due to their ties to Israel or an area within its control, a civil 
wrong, is constitutional. The difficulty then is, that if - as the Supreme 
Court ruled - a call for boycott, including boycott of businesses in the 
settlements, could be a legal wrong to be compensated for, how can Israelis 
argue that they want to exercise their right to engage in conversation with 
aliens who call for boycotting Israel or the settlements (i.e. perpetrate a 
legal wrong)? This difficulty is exacerbated as, according to the majority 
opinion in Avnery, a call for boycott is entitled to a limited protection as 
compared to other "regular" political expressions. 
Nevertheless, the matter is more nuanced than that. The Boycott Law 
specifically dictates, that for a call for boycott to be compensable, there 
must be "a reasonable probability that the call would lead to boycott." 
Moreover, the Supreme Court struck down the punitive damages provision 
in the original law and ruled that an individual who called for boycott could 
be held accountable in civil law, only insofar as another individual incurred 
some real damage by that call. In other words, for a call for boycott to be a 
basis for compensation, not only the content of the call and the circum-
stances that surrounded it must be such as to make it reasonably probable 
that it would lead to a boycott, but an actual boycott has to occur, and actual 
damages must be incurred. 
Amendment 28 does not include any of these elements. It simply states 
that a non-Israeli who publicly called for a boycott of Israel or the settle-
ment (and - the Alqasem decision adds - did not repudiate it) or is affili-
ated with an organization that made such a call - is banned from entering 
Israel. The fact that the call was not materialized in any manner or that there 
is low probability that it would - is supposedly immaterial for the decision 
to allow that person in, regardless of the fact that some Israelis might wish 
to engage in a dialogue with her, for example. Could judicial interpretation 
insert such elements into Amendment 28? For the sake of freedom of 
speech, and let us recall, that all nine judges of the Avnery Court agreed that 
a call for boycott is a political speech entitled for protection, despite their 
ancillary differences on the scope of protection, 222 I believe it could, and 
should. Alternatively, these elements should be inserted by the Court, by 
using the "reading-in" technique. If my argumentation to employ these two 
legal methods (interpretation and reading in) fails, I will alternatively argue 
Judges Hendel and Vogelman, who dissented in Avnery, declined to reconsider the 
Avnery ruling. 
222. Supra note 191. 
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that a refusal by the Minister to employ her article 2(e) waiver authority 
along the suggested lines should be deemed unlawful, for not giving the 
proper normative weight to freedom of speech considerations. If that pro-
position fails too, I will argue that Amendment 28 should be struck down as 
an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech. Here is my explanation. 
Take for example an alien, a professor of philosophy, who once pub-
licly called to boycott products manufactured by Israeli factories located in 
the OPT, and still holds that position. She is invited to give a lecture in a 
symposium to be held by an Israeli institution on "the philosophical under-
pinnings of boycott." Philosophizing on boycott does not necessarily entail 
supporting boycott and is definitely not calling for boycott, and hence -
none of the conference participants would necessarily be involved in perpe-
trating a wrong in torts, according to the Boycott Law. Or, to make things 
even simpler, let's assume that he professor is invited to give a lecture on 
Spinoza's philosophical heritage. The audience's wish to hear the lecture of 
the invited professor is undoubtedly protected under its members' right to 
free speech. Hence, Amendment 28 - which supposedly bars the entry of 
an alien simply because she publicly advocates boycotting Israel or the set-
tlements, notwithstanding if she intends to make such a call upon entry to 
Israel, and the probability that such a call - even if she made it - would 
lead to actual boycott and damages - is prima facie unconstitutional, due 
to the Israeli "listeners" rights and possibly due to the prohibition on gov-
ernmental "viewpoint discrimination." 
A possible way to deal with this constitutional transgression is to inter-
pret the words "a public call to boycott the State of Israel, as defined in the 
Law to Prevent Injury of the State of Israel by Boycott, 2011 [the Boycott 
Law]," as referring not only to the definition of "boycott of the State of 
Israel" in Section 1 of the Boycott Law, but also to the additional elements 
of the tortious wrong, stipulated in Section 2 of the Boycott law (reasonable 
probability to cause boycott). 223 By utilizing this interpretation, the infringe-
223. I find the elements of Section 2 of the Boycott Law are more relevant than 
the elements of Sections 3 and 4 of that law, dealing with withdrawal of economic 
benefits to persons or entities who support boycotting Israel, as Section 2 more directly 
deals with the constitutional right to free speech, and that is the matter of my attention 
in this article. Unlike Section 2, Section 3 and 4 of the Boycott Law don't mandate that 
a call for a boycott has to carry a reasonable probability to cause one for their execution. 
In Avnery, it was unanimously decided to deny the petitions in so far as they related to 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Law, due to lack of ripeness for adjudication, and allowed for 
future petition against them, pursuant to a concrete decision by the Minister of Finance. 
It is important to note that as the Alqasem Court held that Amendment 28 is not punitive 
in its nature but preventive, it should be inferred that it cannot be construed in accor-
dance with Section 3 and 4 of the Boycott Law, which are clearly punitive. 
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ment of the freedom speech of Israeli "would-be listeners," who bonafide 
wish to listen to aliens who support a boycott on Israel or the settlements, is 
minimized. 
If the Court, that might be asked in the future to adopt this interpreta-
tion would rule - against my opinion - that it does not have the power to 
reach this result by way of interpretation, then I think it would have to reach 
it by using the "reading in" technique, which it has used in the past.224 This 
relatively modest reading-in would bring it to the bare minimum necessary 
to meet the level of proportionality that could justify infringement on free-
dom of speech, while taking the Avnery ruling - i.e. that preventing boy-
cott against Israel or the settlements is a "compelling governmental 
interest" - as prevailing. The Israeli legislature decided, after all, in the 
Boycott Law (Amendment 28's "eldest brother" as per Judge Vogelman's 
labeling in Alqasem), that only a call for a boycott, that carried a reasonable 
probability for actual boycott to happen, could be considered a legal wrong. 
If this is the legal standard that the Court found fit for "talkers" who engage 
in boycott discourse, there is no reason why the same standard would not 
apply to "listeners" as well: an Israeli should be entitled to listen to a for-
eigner who once called for a boycott, and even to a foreigner still calling for 
boycott, as long as this call does not carry any reasonable probability for 
actual boycott. After all, even when the "compelling governmental interest" 
is national security, only near certainty to grave and substantial harm justi-
fies, according to Israeli jurisprudence, impeding speech.225 Surely, the 
"danger" of boycott cannot be considered more compelling than the danger 
of revealing classified military information. 
Such an interpretation or, alternatively, "reading in" Amendment 28 is 
especially warranted, as banning a speaker from entering the country is a 
pervasive encroachment on freedom of speech of the Israeli bonafide lis-
teners, in the form of "prior restraint." According to the long-standing Is-
raeli jurisprudence226 (reaffirmed in the Avnery case227), as well as 
224. The Supreme Court of Israel is yet to fully flesh out the "reading in" doctrine 
and the circumstances in which it would be inclined to use it; but it did implement it, 
and gave some general guidelines as to its scope in Israeli constitutional law. See: HCJ 
8300/02 Nasser et al v. The Israeli Government et al, para. 57-60 of President (ret.) 
Bieinisch's opinion (May 22, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew). 
225. See, e.g., HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. The ChiefMilitary Censor, 42(4) PD 617 
(1989). 
226. CA 214/89 Avnery v. Shapiro, 43(3) 840 (1989). 
227. Judge Melcer, in para. 56(b) acknowledged that a court could issue an injunc-
tion to prevent a future call for boycotting Israel or the settlements, if there is a suspi-
cion that an individual is about to make such an expression, based on the Boycott Law. 
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American jurisprudence, 228 this is the most severe form of violation of free 
speech, and therefore could be deemed constitutional only in rare cases, in 
which the governmental interest in particularly compelling. 
True, as the State responded in the principled petition against the 
Amendment, 229 it could be difficult and cumbersome for a border control 
clerk to assess whether a person who called for boycott of Israel or the 
settlements in the past will refrain from doing so in her upcoming visit to 
Israel - as she might promised - or if past, present or future boycott calls 
of that person would lead to actual boycott by anyone and how many. 
Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the primary burden to establish that this 
would not be the case, lies on the alien herself and the citizens wishing to 
hear her. However, an absolute refusal to allow a boycott advocate to enter 
Israel would be outside the scope of Amendment 28, and an unconstitu-
tional violation of the right of freedom of speech. 
Even if my suggested interpretation as well "reading-in" argument are 
both rejected, aliens, who are refused entry or continued stay based on Arti-
cle 2(d), could invoke Article 2(e) of the Entry to Israel Law. This article, 
as mentioned above, authorizes the Minister of Interior to grant an alien a 
permission to enter Israel or sojourn in it, for special reasons, notwithstand-
ing Article 2(d). The court could "inject" freedom of speech considerations 
while reviewing the Minister's exercise of discretion under Article 2(e), just 
as the American Court did while reviewing the Attorney General's refusal 
to grant a waiver under Section 1182(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act, 
when it was still in force. I would, however, advise that he Israeli Supreme 
Court use, while reviewing a case in which the Minister refused to employ 
Article 2(e), and unlike its American counterpart, the ordinary standard of 
review in free speech cases, i.e. strict scrutiny. As Gerald Nueman wrote, in 
the American context: 
The notion that resident aliens can be deported for constitution-
ally protected speech is an atavism in American law. Only the per-
ception of deportation as the withdrawal of a privilege isolated from 
constitutional values has enabled this practice to continue. . . the 
proper perception of deportation as subject to First Amendment side 
constraints requires that deportation grounds be evaluated by the nor-
He noted, however, that this worry is farfetched, as Israeli Courts are particularly hesi-
tant to issue injunctions on future expressions, based on Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on freedom of speech. 
228. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
229. See Section 45 to the State's preliminary response in HCJ 3965/17, supra 
note 208, dated Oct. 11, 2017 (on file with author). 
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mal constitutional standard, which will not permit deportation for 
speech for which the alien could not have been punished. 23 0 
The same is true of a refusal of entry, as long as an Israeli is raising her 
own right to engage in a conversation with the alien, who wishes to enter 
the country. 
If all other suggested legal means fail, then Amendment 28 should be 
deemed unconstitutional. First, it is not even clear if the Amendment would 
survive a "rational basis" scrutiny. 231 Even if it did, it would not survive 
strict scrutiny. It is not convincing to argue that a predictably futile call for 
boycott is alarming enough to justify curtailing one's freedom to convey it, 
and another's freedom to listen to it. 
The Alqasem ruling is not protective enough of freedom of expression, 
as it conditions an alien's entry to Israel, and her continued stay in it, on not 
calling for a boycott of Israel or its settlements whatsoever. My suggestion 
is more protective of freedom of speech, as it provides that even if Alqasem 
returns to vocally support boycott, and tries to convince others to do so, she 
would not be deported if there is no reasonable probability that her call 
would cause actual boycott. It is, indeed, ironical that freedom of speech 
protection would be given to a speech so long as it is not perceived by the 
decision-maker and the Court as persuasive or powerful enough, yet this is 
an unfortunate outcome caused by the Avnery ruling. The suggested legal 
analysis would at least somewhat expand the marketplace of ideas. This is a 
good in itself, and might also potentially enable gradual, down-the-road 
change. 
CONCLUSION 
In the era of globalization, information easily flows among countries. 
Persons could also potentially move across borders, by advanced transpor-
tation, with little difficulty and many of them actually do. While most of us 
could read about the opinions of people from other countries on the web, 
there is still a unique effect to face-to-face interactions. Banning a foreigner 
from entering a country because of her political opinion, or deporting her 
for that reason, might not only adversely affect the foreigner's opportunity 
to express herself, but also infringe on the citizens' right to be exposed to 
different political ideas. Hence, ideological exclusion of foreigners is not 
merely a matter of immigration policy. It is, first and foremost, a matter of 
230. NEUMAN, supra note 2, at 109. 
231. One might argue that no rational basis exists, as the non-Israeli boycott sup-
porter could continue advancing that cause while out of Israel. 
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constitutional law and human rights; and as such - should be subject to 
strict judicial scrutiny. 
The history of ideological bans in U.S. immigration law should serve 
as a warning sign to Israeli policy-makers, judges and laypersons. It is not a 
coincidence that such bans were most broadly employed in the U.S. during 
the McCarthy era, when freedom of speech was most under attack. Israeli 
protectors of democracy should keep an open eye and do whatever they can 
to ensure that immigratory ideological bans would not lead to silencing crit-
ical or unpopular views, and the suppression of Israeli democracy itself. 
